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Thirty Years of Veterans Law: Welcome to the 
Wild West 
Stacey-Rae Simcox* 
“Sometimes it isn’t being fast that counts, or even accurate; but willing.”1 
John Wayne 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The rise of veterans issues in our local communities since the Global 
War on Terrorism began in 2001 has seen the phrase “veterans law” 
grow and surge in a number of different aspects.  The term “veterans 
law” is a relatively recent term in jurisprudence and, over the past 
decade, has evolved into many different meanings.  Among other things, 
the term could refer to the law issued from the federal appellate court 
deciding veterans’ claims for benefits from the Department of Veterans 
Affairs (VA).2  “Veterans law” could also be used to discuss the 
litigation and legislation regarding the types of discharges veterans face 
and the implications of these discharges when seeking benefits. 
In 1988, when Congress created a new federal appellate court whose 
sole purpose was to provide oversight to decisions made by the VA, it 
was the first time that judicial oversight was specifically applied to 
veterans’ claims.  As Chief Judge Frank Q. Nebeker, the first Chief 
Judge of the new court phrased the issue, “For the first time, the court 
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presiding over the Wild West with temperance and judiciousness; Judge Michael Allen for being a 
trailblazer; Shirley Booker and Rocky Roodhouse for understanding and support; all of the students 
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 1.   John Wayne Enterprises, LLC, John Wayne Legacy Quotes, https://johnwayne.com/quotes 
[https://perma.cc/TX2S-PUKL] (last visited Nov. 18, 2018). 
 2.   Stacey-Rae Simcox & John Paul Cimino, § 6.03 Sources of Veterans Law, in 
SERVICEMEMBER AND VETERANS RIGHTS (Brian Clauss & Stacey-Rae Simcox eds., 2017); id. 
§ 6.04(2) Basic Eligibility Issues. 
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brought the principle of stare decisis to the veterans’ community.”3  As 
this court, the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims 
(CAVC), turned thirty in 2018, it seems an appropriate time to consider 
the landscape of veterans law since the last articles considering this 
broad issue were published a decade ago for the twentieth anniversary of 
the court. 
In this past decade, veterans law issues have seen huge growth and 
public awareness with infusions of new practitioners, new issues of law 
being decided by the courts, new major Congressional legislation for the 
first time in decades, and veterans law issues in the news and mainstream 
culture.  Many experienced practitioners in this area are astounded by the 
movement in this area of law in the past few years, yet they would also 
note that this movement has been a long time coming.  To compare the 
practice of veterans law to a train gathering momentum as it moves along 
the tracks would be appropriate.  However, another apt comparison is to 
the undeveloped legal system of old movies in which John Wayne 
implements justice in a wild and untamed land.  The analogy of the Wild 
West is sometimes used amongst veterans law practitioners and 
professors who teach in this area to describe its fresh expanse, often 
devoid of legal precedent, built on shifting ground, and offering a 
landscape where a true pioneer can both make an impact and see 
measurable success. 
This Article is intended as an overview of three major advancements 
in veterans law in the past decade: major changes in federal court case 
law regarding veterans benefits through the prism of the thirtieth 
anniversary of the CAVC, the most sweeping legislative changes to 
appeals of veterans benefits decisions in the past thirty years, and the 
new push to force the Department of Defense to equitably administer the 
discharges of veterans with post-traumatic stress disorder and traumatic 
brain injuries.  To accomplish this review, Part II will look at the CAVC 
and its evolution, particularly in the past decade.  By examining the roots 
of the court’s creation, the impact it has had and will continue to have on 
veterans law becomes a richer discussion, particularly as one recognizes 
that the CAVC is on the burgeoning frontier of veterans benefits 
jurisprudence.  Part III will consider the impact of new legislation shaped 
during President Obama’s administration and signed into law by 
President Trump in 2017, marking the first major overhaul in the way the 
VA processes claims since the creation of the CAVC thirty years ago.  
                                                            
 3.   Frank Q. Nebeker, Jurisdiction of the United States Court of Veterans Appeals: Searching 
Out the Limits, 46 ME. L. REV. 5, 5 (1994). 
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Part IV will discuss the growing investigation, litigation, and legislative 
pushes on behalf of veterans whose discharges from military service are 
characterized in a way that prevents them from re-entering civilian life 
successfully and seeking medical treatment or benefits related to their 
service.  Part V will offer some thoughts on the future of veterans law in 
the next decade and things to watch for as it continues to expand and 
evolve. 
Although any one of these topics could serve as an article in itself, 
the purpose of this Article is to give a broader overview of efforts to 
work within the law to make changes for our nation’s veterans in the past 
decade.  The reason for writing this Article is to give veterans, attorneys, 
judges, and law students reason to be excited about the real opportunities 
available to make a difference on a large scale—opportunities that 
become rarer and rarer in other areas of law where jurisprudence has 
been established for decades.  The examples discussed in this article are 
just that—examples.  So much more can and will be done by those who 
are motivated.  With that, welcome to the Wild West where you can be a 
true pioneer! 
II. THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS 
(CAVC) TURNS THIRTY AND SAILS INTO “UNCHARTED WATERS.” 
On November 18, 1988, President Ronald Reagan signed the 
Veterans’ Judicial Review Act (VJRA or “the Act”) into law.4  Title III 
of this Act created the CAVC.5  Prior to the establishment of the CAVC, 
the VA operated as a two-tiered administrative system for adjudicating 
veterans’6 claims for the various benefits offered to them by the agency.  
These benefits include pensions, education funds, disability 
compensation, guaranteed home loans, and more.7  As before the Act’s 
passage, the first level of adjudication of a claim occurs at the agency of 
original jurisdiction, referred to as the VA Regional Office (VARO).8  
The VARO issues a decision on the veteran’s claim and if the veteran 
                                                            
 4.   See Veterans’ Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105 (1988). 
 5.   §§ 301–303, 102 Stat. at 4113–22.  
 6.   The term veteran is used in this article to describe the type of claimant seeking benefits 
from the VA.  While other claimants are permitted, for instance dependent children and widowed 
spouses, veterans are the overwhelming majority of applicants for benefits and thus that term is used 
throughout.   
 7.   Veterans Benefits Administration, About VBA, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, 
http://www.benefits.va.gov/benefits/about.asp [https://perma.cc/U5J5-ZL42] (last visited Nov. 18, 
2018). 
 8.   See 38 U.S.C. §§ 5107, 5110(a) (2012); 38 C.F.R. § 19.24 (2016). 
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does not agree with the decision, the veteran can file an appeal to the 
agency termed a Notice of Disagreement.9  In response to the Notice of 
Disagreement, the VARO issues a Statement of the Case, which is a 
more in-depth explanation of the VARO’s decision.10  Veterans 
dissatisfied with the ultimate decision of the VARO after receiving a 
Statement of the Case can appeal to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals 
(BVA or “the Board”) by filing what is referred to as a VA Form 9.11  
The Board is part of the VA and ultimately answers to the Secretary of 
the VA.12  Before 1988, veterans could file a request for reconsideration 
with the Board if they were unhappy with the Board’s decision, but 
further appellate review by another body was precluded.13 
Noticeably absent in the appeals process for veterans prior to the 
Act’s passage was any independent judiciary review.14  Before the VJRA 
specifically created judicial review of the VA, the Federal Circuit noted 
that “the VA stood ‘in “splendid isolation as the single federal 
administrative agency whose major functions were explicitly insulated 
from judicial review.”’”15  Conversations about creating judicial review 
of the VA began in Congress in 1952.16  From then until 1988, there was 
dispute about whether there should be any judicial review of the VA 
decision-making process.17  Before being appointed as a judge on the 
CAVC’s bench in 2003, Lawrence B. Hagel was the Deputy General 
                                                            
 9.   See 38 U.S.C. § 7105(b)(1).  It is important to remember that this system has been 
radically altered by Congress with the passage of the Appeals Modernization Act discussed in 
Section III of this article.  This original system of appealing VA decisions, referred to as the “legacy 
system,” was the system in place at the time of the VJRA’s passage and will continue to exist 
alongside the new Appeals Modernization Act until all appeals in the legacy system are complete.  
Right now there are several hundred thousand of these legacy appeals. 
 10.   38 C.F.R. §§ 19.26(d), 19.29 (2016).   
 11.   38 U.S.C. § 7105(d)(3). 
 12.   38 U.S.C. § 7101(a). 
 13.   38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1988) (current version at 38 U.S.C. § 511(a) (2012)). 
 14.   Id. 
 15.   Gardner v. Brown, 5 F.3d 1456, 1463 (1993) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 100-963, at 10 (1988), 
as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5782, 5791).  The provisions of 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1970) read 
as follows:  
On and after October 17, 1940, except as provided in sections 775, 784, and as to matters 
arising under chapter 37 of this title, the decisions of the Administrator on any question 
of law or fact under any law administered by the Veterans’ Administration providing 
benefits for veterans and their dependents or survivors shall be final and conclusive and 
no other official or any court of the United States shall have power or jurisdiction to 
review any such decision by an action in the nature of mandamus or otherwise.   
Act of Aug. 12, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-376, § 8(a), 84 Stat. 790. 
 16.   Lawrence B. Hagel & Michael P. Horan, Five Years Under the Veterans’ Judicial Review 
Act: The VA is Brought Kicking and Screaming Into the World of Meaningful Due Process, 46 ME. 
L. REV. 43, 44 (1994).  
 17.   Id. at 45.  
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Counsel for the Paralyzed Veterans of America.18  In 1994, five years 
after the passage of the VJRA, then-Deputy General Counsel Hagel co-
authored an article that observed “[t]here is complete unanimity of 
opinion on few issues affecting the veterans community.  Judicial review 
is an example.”19  Reviewing some of the arguments for and against 
judicial review helps to give context for issues only now being seriously 
addressed in the courts and via legislation. 
There were several considerations that weighed against 
implementing judicial review.  First, Congress believed that the VA was 
and should remain a non-adversarial system where veterans were assisted 
along the way by VA employees.  The VA’s benefits system was 
specifically crafted by Congress “to function . . . with a high degree 
of . . . solicitude for the claimant.”20  The VA’s resulting veteran-friendly 
system reflects the “congressional intent to create an Agency 
environment in which VA is actually engaged in a continuing dialogue 
with claimants in a paternalistic, collaborative effort to provide every 
benefit to which the claimant is entitled.”21  The VA was also charged 
with giving veterans the benefit of the doubt in adjudicating their 
claims.22  In upholding its duty to help veterans, the VA was tasked with 
many other duties, including but not limited to assisting veterans in 
obtaining medical evaluations and evidence, reviewing veterans’ claims 
sympathetically, and gathering evidence to support a veterans’ claims.23  
Adding judicial oversight to the VA seemed unnecessary as the VA was 
not intended to be an adversary of the veteran, but instead was supposed 
to be a partner and benevolent provider.24  Adding judicial review to this 
system also seemed dangerous because the VA would automatically be 
put on the defensive with regard to its decisions on a veteran’s claim, 
                                                            
 18.   Judge Lawrence B. Hagel, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS, 
http://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/hagel.php [https://perma.cc/5ZDQ-CPSC] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019). 
 19.   See Hagel & Horan, supra note 16, at 43–44. 
 20.   Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 311 (1985). 
 21.   Evans v. Shinseki, 25 Vet. App. 7, 16 (2011). 
 22.   38 U.S.C. § 5107(b) (2012) (“When there is an approximate balance of positive and 
negative evidence regarding any issue material to the determination of a matter, the Secretary shall 
give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant.”).  Congress intended the benefit of the doubt standard 
to be a valuable tool to continually enforce the VA’s non-adversarial and veteran-friendly 
adjudication of claims.  Hodge v. West, 155 F.3d 1356, 1362–63, (1998) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 100-
963, at 13 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5782, 5794–95). 
 23.   These duties to veterans were formalized through the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 
2000, Pub. L. 106-475, 114 Stat. 2096, 38 U.S.C. § 5103A and § 5107 (2012).  See also 38 U.S.C. § 
5109. 
 24.   S.11, The Proposed Veterans’ Administration Adjudication Procedure and Judicial Review 
Act, and S. 2292, Veterans’ Judicial Review Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 
100th Cong. 481 (1988) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of the Veterans Administration (VA)). 
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therefore negating the ostensibly benevolent and non-adversarial system 
created.25 
Second, there was concern that adding judicial review would 
increase the number of attorneys practicing in this area of law at every 
level.26  Veterans service organizations (VSOs), such as the American 
Legion and the Disabled American Veterans, represent their veterans in 
the VA’s system at no cost.27  The VSOs, who had strong lobbyists in 
Congress, were opposed to changes to the system that would introduce 
more lawyers.  The VSOs had, and continue to exert, great power within 
the system as they were certainly the primary providers of assistance to 
veterans in navigating the VA’s complicated benefits system.28  They had 
no desire to forfeit their preeminence to attorneys.29  Additionally, 
Congress had long seen attorneys as unscrupulous in the representation 
of veterans.  As far back as the Civil War, Congress had labored under 
the assumption that most attorneys swindle veterans out of money while 
doing very little work on behalf of the veteran.30  For this reason, in 
1862, Congress set a limit of $5 as the amount of money an attorney 
could be paid for helping a veteran.31  In 1864, this fee limit was raised to 
                                                            
 25.   Id. at 393 (statement of National Vietnam Veterans Coalition); id. at 481 (statement of the 
Veterans Administration (VA)). 
 26.   Id. at 392–93 (statement of National Vietnam Veterans Coalition); id. at 500 (statement of 
Donald L. Ivers, General Counsel, Veterans Administration). 
 27.   Id. at 393 (statement of National Vietnam Veterans Coalition); Laurence R. Helfer, The 
Politics of Judicial Structure: Creating the United States Court of Veterans Appeals, 25 CONN. L. 
REV. 155, 159–60 (1992). 
 28.   Helfer, supra note 27, at 160.  It may seem paradoxical that a system designed to be 
veteran-friendly is rife with complexity.  One commenter explained the situation this way:  
In the case of the veterans benefits system, decades of procedural rulings have increased 
the complexity of adjudication. It has thus become increasingly difficult for non-attorney 
claimants and adjudicators to understand the system, and it now takes dramatically longer 
for VA to issue initial decisions and process appeals. Rarely will procedural rulings be 
abrogated. Rather, the layers accumulate with predictable, negative consequences for 
timeliness and flexibility. This buildup of complex procedures has created a paradox 
inherent in the modern veterans law system: the proliferation of procedures intended to 
make the system more “veteran friendly” has, in fact, made the system forbidding to 
claimants and caused increasingly painful delays.   
James Ridgway, Area Summary: Fresh Eyes on Persistent Issues: Veterans Law at the Federal 
Circuit in 2012, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1037, 1044–1045 (2013) (footnotes omitted).  The CAVC has 
also commented on this problem.  DeLisio v. Shinseki, 25 Vet. App. 45, 63 (2011) (Lance, J., 
concurring) (“There is an unfortunate—and not entirely unfounded—belief that veterans law is 
becoming too complex for the thousands of regional office adjudicators that must apply the rules on 
the front lines in over a million cases per year.”).   
 29.   Helfer, supra note 27; Hearings, supra note 24, at 421 (statement of Veterans Due 
Process). 
 30.   Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 360 (1985).  
 31.   Dennis Whelan, William Henry Glasson and the First Hundred Years of Federal 
Compensation for Service Connected Disability in America 46 (2013) (Villanova Univ., Working 
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$10.32  These limited fees were intended to stop what Congress believed 
to be predatory behavior.33 
In 1985, the Supreme Court heard a constitutional challenge to the 
$10 limit brought under the Fifth Amendment’s procedural Due Process 
Clause.  In holding the limit constitutional, the Court made very clear 
that in this matter “[a] necessary concomitant of Congress’ desire that a 
veteran not need a representative to assist him in making his claim was 
that the system should be as informal and nonadversarial as possible.”34  
As the years wore on, this limit stayed in place and continued to dissuade 
attorneys from participating in the system because a $10 fee for legal 
work in 1980 was not worth any attorney’s time, either to become 
competent in the area of veterans benefits or to create a practice out of 
it.35  It was not until the passage of the VJRA in 1988 that the limitations 
on attorneys’ fees were altered, primarily by permitting attorneys to 
charge fees when representing veterans on disability claim appeals.36 
Third, there was widespread concern that introducing judicial review 
would cause delay in veterans receiving their benefits.  The VA was 
concerned that attorneys would cause delays by advancing the client’s 
cause, as opposed to looking for truth.37  Others were less generous, 
asserting that attorneys would purposefully cause delay to increase their 
fees.38  Another apprehension regarding delay was that matters would 
become more complicated and more formalized, requiring the VA to 
spend more time on each claim.39  Finally, unease that the federal court 
system was already overwhelmed led to concern that these claims would 
contribute to an already-taxed judicial system.40 
                                                            
Paper, Aug. 31, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2344337 [https://perma. 
cc/9WR4-J2T2]. 
 32.   See id. at 48, 50. 
 33.   For example, see the comments on the Senate floor of Senator Edward Bragg in 1886: 
“Mr. Speaker, these [attorneys] that pretend to be ‘friends of soldiers’ are the friends of soldiers as 
vultures are the friends of dead bodies—because they feed and fatten on them. . . .  They have the 
voice of Jacob, but their hand has the clutch of Esau.”  WILLIAM H. GLASSON, FEDERAL MILITARY 
PENSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 214–15 (David Kinley ed. 1918).   
 34.   Walters, 473 U.S. at 323.  
 35.   Hearings, supra note 24, at 56–7 (statement of J. Thomas Burch, Jr., Chairman, National 
Vietnam Veterans Coalition), 385 (statement of Frank E.G. Weil, American Veterans Committee). 
 36.   See 38 U.S.C. § 7263(c)–(d) (2012). 
 37.   Hearings, supra note 24, at 500 (statement of Donald L. Ivers, General Counsel, Veterans 
Administration). 
 38.   Id. at 603 (statement of Disabled American Veterans), 568 (statement of Jerry L. Mashaw, 
Professor of Law at Yale Law School). 
 39.   Id. at 493 (statement of Donald L. Ivers, General Counsel, Veterans Administration). 
 40.   Id. at 333–34 (statement of Hon. Morris S. Arnold & Hon. Stephen G. Breyer, on behalf of 
the Judicial Conference of the United States). 
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In contrast to the aforementioned arguments, there were many 
reasons articulated that compelled the implementation of judicial review.  
One major reason for the Court’s creation was a belief that the VA’s 
system (as it was in the 1980s) was malfunctioning.  The Chairman of 
the Senate Committee on Veterans’ Affairs at the time, Senator Alan 
Cranston, commented at the opening of testimony regarding judicial 
review that: “I have said that the need for judicial review does not 
depend on whether or not the present system of claims adjudication is 
broken. . . .  In the past year or two, however, it has become increasingly 
clear that the entire claims adjudication process, including the Board, has 
some serious problems.”41 
The extent of the problems varied.  There were contentions that the 
Board, the highest level of appeal within the VA for decisions regarding 
benefits, was failing to consistently uphold its charge to maintain a non-
adversarial system.  One veterans’ group accused the VA of “using 
deception to deny hearings at crucial and sensitive stages of the 
adjudication process[,] . . . denying claims for failure of veterans to 
respond to correspondence never sent[,] . . . [and] (f)raudulently 
enhancing productivity performance records to achieve merit bonuses 
and to promote empire building schemes.”42  Another proponent of 
judicial review testified that: 
[T]he VA system is highly adversarial.  It is loaded with lawyers on 
one side, and it is filled with pitfalls for the unrepresented claimant on 
the other side.  We have, for example, had several clients who were 
unrepresented at the local level and whose claims have been dismissed 
by the Board of Veterans’ Appeals for the clients’ failures to use 
particular forms or certain magic words or forms of pleading. These 
dismissals have cost our clients many months of time and potentially 
many thousands of dollars in lost compensation.43 
An observer who advocated for judicial review offered one 
explanation for this observed variance between the required non-
adversarial environment and the apparent adversarial behavior—it is 
unrealistic to believe VA employees can act in the best interests of the 
government and the veteran at the same time.44 
                                                            
 41.   Hearings, supra note 24, at 2 (statement of Sen. Alan Cranston, Chairman, S.  Comm. on 
Veterans’ Affairs). 
 42.   Id. at 409 (statement of Veterans Due Process). 
 43.   Id. at 6 (statement of Susan D. Bennett, Esq., Assistant Professor of Law and Director, 
Public Interest Law Clinic, Washington College of Law, American University, Washington, D.C.). 
 44.   Id. at 385 (statement of Frank E.G. Weil, American Veterans Committee); see 38 U.S.C. § 
5107(b) (2012).  This dichotomy has been pointed out as a unique aspect of the VA’s procedural 
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Other complaints regarding the problems in the system revolved 
around arbitrary decision-making at the agency.  One veterans’ advocate 
observed that “(t)he reasonable doubt doctrine . . . is only applied it 
seems when the overwhelming weight of evidence, in fact, supports the 
veteran’s claim” despite the requirement that when evidence is in 
equipoise, the decision should go to the veteran.45  Other groups 
advocating for judicial review were less aggressive in the necessity for 
review, but nonetheless advanced the value of court intervention.  For 
example, the Veterans of Foreign Wars remarked upon the fact that the 
pressure on the Board to move faster coupled with increasingly 
complicated claims created a system where “human nature being what it 
is, errors in judgment may occur.”46 
There were also concerns that by prohibiting judicial review of 
veterans benefits claims, veterans were not being given the same rights to 
fairness, equity, or due process that other citizens receive.  One Senator 
noted that while felons, the mentally ill, and illegal aliens are afforded 
judicial review of determinations affecting them, veterans are not.47  
Another commented, “[w]hat an irony that the veterans who have fought 
to see that we all have these legal rights, are the very ones who are being 
denied those rights now.”48  One veterans’ advocate remarked “if 
veterans are a special class—I think for some purposes they are and 
should be viewed as such—it would seem to be that they deserve more 
rather than less by way of procedural protection.”49 
Finally, scholars and others hoped that creation of judicial review of 
the VA adjudication process would allow for mass reform of the VA 
system, as opposed to making decisions in individual cases that would 
fail to have widespread effect.  Many believed that class action suits 
would be the best vehicle for this type of reform and have advocated for 
it since debate began.50 
                                                            
adjudication system.  See James D. Ridgway, Why So Many Remands?: A Comparative Analysis of 
Appellate Review by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, 1 VETERANS L. REV. 
113, 126–27 (2009).  
 45.   Hearings, supra note 24, at 6 (statement of Susan D. Bennett, Esq., Assistant Professor of 
Law and Director, Public Interest Law Clinic, Washington College of Law, American University, 
Washington, D.C.). 
 46.   Id. at 313 (statement of The Veterans of Foreign Wars). 
 47.   Id. at 17 (statement of Sen. John Kerry). 
 48.   Id. at 47 (statement of Sen. Thomas A. Daschle). 
 49.   Id. at 11 (statement of Eugene R. Fidell, Esq., Partner, Klores, Feldesman, & Tucker, 
Washington, D.C.). 
 50.   See, e.g., Michael P. Allen, The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims at 
Twenty: A Proposal for a Legislative Commission to Consider its Future, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 361, 
404 (2009); Hagel & Horan, supra note 16, at 65.  
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A. “A Ruby in the Dung” 
As the debate drew to a close during the Senate Veterans’ Affairs 
Committee hearing on judicial review in 1988, the following exchange 
occurred: 
Senator SIMPSON. I will be very interested to see what you and the 
chairman put together after these hearings. I think very possibly it will 
be very close to where you want to be. 
Senator MURKOWSKI. There won’t be too much sausage. 
[Laughter.] 
Senator SIMPSON. Well, there will be, without question, sausage that 
is the way our work is; but occasionally, we find a ruby in the dung, 
and that is what keeps us going. [Laughter.]51 
The dung in this metaphor could be any multitude of issues.  
However, the ruby created from decades of wrestling and debate about 
the issue of judicial review is unquestionably the CAVC.  The VJRA 
created the CAVC as an Article I court.52  Its judges are appointed to the 
bench for a term of fifteen years.53  In the original legislation, the CAVC 
was authorized one chief judge and at least two but no more than six 
associate judges.54  Effective on December 31, 2009, Congress 
temporarily authorized two more judges to be added to the court, making 
the total judges on the court nine.55 
The court has exclusive jurisdiction over final decisions of the 
Board, and the enacting statute prohibits the Secretary from seeking 
review of the Board’s decisions.56  Its jurisdiction was constructed from 
the competing pieces of legislation proposed by the House and Senate, 
with heavy input from VSOs and other stakeholders.57  As a result, 
                                                            
 51.   Hearings, supra note 24, at 10. 
 52.   See Veterans’ Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, § 4051, 102 Stat. 4105, 4113 
(1988) (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. § 7251 (2012)). 
 53.   38 U.S.C. § 7253(c) (2012). 
 54.   § 4053, 102 Stat. at 4114.   
 55.   38 U.S.C. § 7253(h)(5)(i)(1) (2012 & Supp. 2017). 
 56.   38 U.S.C. § 7252(a) (2012). 
 57.   See generally Helfer, supra note 27 (explaining the different constituent groups involved 
in the process of advocating for specific aspects of the VCAA); Barton F. Stichman, The Veterans’ 
Judicial Review Act of 1988: Congress Introduces Courts and Attorneys to Veterans’ Benefits 
Proceedings, 41 ADMIN. L. REV. 365 (1989) (describing the history and importance of judicial 
review in the veterans benefits process). 
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Congress granted the CAVC the authority to: (1) decide all relevant 
questions of law; (2) interpret constitutional, statutory, and regulatory 
provisions; (3) determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an 
action of the Secretary; (4) compel action of the Secretary unlawfully 
withheld or unreasonably delayed; (5) hold unlawful and set aside 
decisions, findings, conclusions, rules and regulations adopted by the 
Secretary or Board that are arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, contrary to constitutional right, or in excess of statutory 
authority, among other things; and (6) hold unlawful and set aside or 
reverse findings of material fact made by the VA that are clearly 
erroneous.58 
Proceedings at the court are adversarial, which is a sharp departure 
from the VA system below.59  At the CAVC, the interests of the 
Secretary of the VA are represented by attorneys from VA’s Office of 
General Counsel.60  The veterans themselves may be pro se or 
represented by agents or attorneys authorized to practice before the 
court.61  Veterans or the Secretary may appeal decisions of the CAVC to 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.62  The Federal 
Circuit’s jurisdiction over decisions of the CAVC is limited to appeals 
involving “the validity of any statute or regulation or any interpretation 
thereof” or “interpret[ing] constitutional and statutory provisions.”63  
After the Federal Circuit, a veteran or the VA may apply for review from 
the Supreme Court of the United States.64 
B. An Assessment of the Hopes and Fears 
In 2009, a widely recognized and preeminent scholar of the CAVC, 
then-Professor Michael P. Allen of Stetson University College of Law, 
                                                            
 58.   38 U.S.C. § 7261(a).  The “clearly erroneous” standard differs slightly from the 
Administrative Procedure Act’s “arbitrary and capricious” standard applied to questions of fact.  See 
Marsh v. Oregon Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)). 
 59.   See 38 U.S.C. § 7263(a) (marking the first mention of attorney representation to protect 
the interests of the Secretary of the VA); Forshey v. Principi, 284 F.3d 1335, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(en banc), superseded on other grounds by Veterans Benefits Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-330, § 
402(a), 116 Stat. 2820, 2832. 
 60.   38 U.S.C. § 7263(a); see Forshey, 284 F.3d at 1355.  
 61.   38 U.S.C. § 5904(c); 38 C.F.R. §§ 14.628, 14.629(b)(1)(iii)–(iv) (2018); see generally The 
Role of National, State, and County Veterans Service Officers in Claims Development: Hearing 
Before the H. Subcomm. on Disability Assistance and Memorial Affairs, 109th Cong. (2006) 
(discussing the work of VSOs in the claims process and their interaction with and advocacy on 
behalf of veterans). 
 62.   38 U.S.C. § 7292(c). 
 63.   Id. 
 64.   Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (2012). 
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wrote an article assessing the first twenty years of the CAVC’s successes 
and tribulations.65  For a number of years, Judge Allen was the only 
academician analyzing and advising on the operation of the CAVC.  In 
his 2009 Article, Judge Allen commented on some of the concerns of 
those advocating for and against the judiciary taking a role in veterans-
benefits adjudications.66  Overall, Judge Allen’s assessment of the 
CAVC’s role in the process and the Court’s decisions shaping veterans 
law was a positive one. 
It seems appropriate to take a fresh look at the concerns of 
stakeholders in 1988 and Judge Allen’s article of ten years ago to 
measure at least some of the clarity and quagmire that judicial review has 
contributed to the adjudication of veterans’ benefits over the last ten 
years.  To do so, this Article will look briefly at three separate hopes and 
fears expressed in 1988 and, in part, commented on by Judge Allen and 
others: the effect of judicial review on the quality of decision-making at 
the VA and the non-adversarial process, the fear that judicial review will 
cause delay in the system, and the hope that judicial review will bring 
more due process and equity to the VA’s adjudication system. 
1. The Effect of Judicial Review on the VA’s Decision-Making and the 
Non-Adversarial Process 
One of the major concerns of proponents of judicial review were 
accusations that the VAROs and the Board were making arbitrary 
decisions, with no outside and objective body holding them 
accountable.67  The concern about the Board’s cavalier handling of 
veterans’ claims seems to have been a grounded one.  As Senator 
Cranston remarked in the 1988 hearings, “[t]he Chairman of the BVA 
commented during a recent House hearing that even the specter of 
judicial review has made some of the people reviewing BVA claims 
more careful to see that the board [sic] does everything that it can.”68 
The other major consideration that goes hand-in-hand with arbitrary 
                                                            
 65.   See Allen, supra note 50.  In 2017, Professor Allen was appointed and confirmed to the 
bench of the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims by President Trump.  Therefore, he will be 
referred to as Judge Allen throughout the rest of this article.  See Judge Michael P. Allen, U.S. 
COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERAN CLAIMS, https://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/allen.php 
[https://perma.cc/R3T3-LY99] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019). 
 66.   Allen, supra note 50.  
 67.   Hearings, supra note 24, at 6 (statement of Susan D. Bennett, Esq., Assistant Professor of 
Law and Director, Public Interest Law Clinic, Washington College of Law, American University, 
Washington, D.C.). 
 68.   Id. at 2 (statement of Sen. Alan Cranston, Chairman, S. Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs). 
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decision-making involves the non-adversarial nature of the VA system.  
Opponents of judicial review were afraid that adding legal review to the 
VA’s adjudication system would inherently create adversity.69  
Proponents of review maintained that the system was already adversarial 
in certain instances.  They argued that the VA needed reminding of its 
role in the system as facilitator, and not bouncer, of claims that may be 
meritorious if the VA applied the appropriate veteran-friendly legal 
standards in the adjudication process.70 
In light of these concerns, it is widely recognized that with the 
advent of court review the nature of the veterans benefits adjudication 
has changed.  The Federal Circuit remarked ten years after the creation 
of the CAVC that the non-adversarial nature of the entire benefits 
process was altered significantly: “[I]t appears the system has changed 
from ‘a nonadversarial, ex parte, paternalistic system for adjudicating 
veterans’ claims,’ to one in which veterans . . . must satisfy formal legal 
requirements, often without the benefit of legal counsel, before they are 
entitled to administrative and judicial review.”71 
In 1996, a Congressionally-convened commission charged with 
evaluating the VA adjudication process including the effect of the still 
fairly new judicial review, reported that the creation of judicial review 
created an “adversarial paternalism.”72  While acknowledging the 
contradiction in those terms, the commission noted that: 
When an adversarial review is imposed on a paternalistic adjudication 
and there are no definitive rules that describe the limits of adjudicative 
paternalism, for all practical purposes the judicial review standard 
becomes, “Was VA paternalistic enough?”  As each case presents 
different circumstances, the boundaries of paternalism can be and are 
continually extended.73 
                                                            
 69.   See, e.g., id. at 7 (statement of Sen. Simpson), id. at 13 (testimony of Eugene R. Fidell, 
Esq., Partner, Klores, Feldesman, & Tucker, Washington, D.C.), id. at 15 (testimony of Keith A. 
Rosenberg, Esq., Whiteford, Taylor & Preston), id. at 481 (statement of the Veterans Administration 
(VA)), and id. at 393 (statement of National Vietnam Veterans Coalition). 
 70.   See, e.g., id. at 409 (statement of Veterans Due Process); id. at 6 (statement of Susan D. 
Bennett, Esq., Assistant Professor of Law and Director, Public Interest Law Clinic, Washington 
College of Law, American University, Washington, D.C.). 
 71.   Bailey v. West, 160 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting Collaro v. Dep’t of 
Veterans Affairs, 136 F.3d 1304, 1309–10 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
 72.   THE VETERAN. VA’S CUSTOMER: WHO CLAIMS BENEFITS AND WHY?, VETERANS’ 
CLAIMS ADJUDICATION COMM’N 160 (1996) [hereinafter THE VETERAN] 
http://www.veteranslawlibrary.com/files/Commission_Reports/Melidosian_Commission_Report_De
c_1996.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q5LB-5DWZ]. 
 73.   Id.  
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The commission noted that before judicial review, the VA was only 
accountable to itself, allowing for cursory decision-making with little or 
no explanation to veterans concerning the reasons for the outcome.74  
However, to comply with broad legal requirements decided at the court, 
the VA has had to make more complex and intricate decisions about 
benefit claims, which take more time to create.75 
Judge Allen noted that in 2009, the generalized perception of 
Congress, the CAVC, and other observers was that the decision-making 
process of the VA had been “improved” overall as a result of judicial 
review.76  While the issue of the length of time the VA takes to work on a 
veteran’s claims will be discussed further in this article, it is appropriate 
to first consider whether over the past decade the overall quality of VA 
decision-making has been improved and whether the effects of judicial 
review on the non-adversarial process have created change in the system. 
In terms of measuring the effects of judicial review on the quality of 
VA decisions, it is difficult to agree on a standard of measurement.  
While the decisions of the VAROs and Board are more complex since 
the creation of the CAVC, are they actually deciding issues correctly?  In 
2009, Judge Allen appropriately noted that if one were to measure the 
quality of administrative opinions in terms of result, there was no 
baseline before 1988.77  He also observed that in the second decade of 
judicial review, the rates of the CAVC’s reversal of Board decisions 
from 1999 to 2009 remained relatively stable.78  For instance, in 2008 the 
CAVC made decisions on the merits of approximately 3,480 cases 
concerning veterans’ benefits claims.79  Approximately 80% of the 
decisions of the Board were remanded in whole or in part for some 
failure on the Board’s part.80  Additionally, the court granted 2,433 
applications for Equal Access to Justice Act fees (EAJA) in 2008.81  
EAJA is the federal law regarding lawsuits against the United States 
government that permits a prevailing party’s legal counsel to collect fees 
                                                            
 74.   Id. at 193. 
 75.   Id. at 114. 
 76.   See Allen, supra note 50, at 376. 
 77.   Id. 
 78.   Id. 
 79.   U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS, ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2000-2008) 
https://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/documents/Annual_Report_FY_2009_October_1_2008_to_Septemb
er_30_2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DXD-PUWE].  This number excludes those decisions made on 
petitions for extraordinary relief.   
 80.   Id.  
 81.   Id. 
2019 THIRTY YEARS OF VETERANS LAW 527 
from the federal government.82  To collect these fees, the court must find 
that the government’s position in the case was not “substantially 
justified.”83  The phrase “substantially justified” implies “justified to a 
degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.”84  This means that in 
2008, the Board was unreasonable in its decision-making towards 
veterans in 70% of the cases the court decided.85  As a comparison, the 
CAVC in 1998 decided 1,352 cases on the merits.86  Of these cases, 60% 
were remanded in whole or in part.87  At that time, because attorney 
representation had been discouraged for so long by the low fee rate 
previously discussed, almost half of the veterans in the court were 
unrepresented.88  Even so, 380 EAJA applications were granted.89  
Again, while these numbers indicate stability in the court’s decisions, 
they are alarming in their own right that the VA is consistently failing to 
implement the veteran-friendly system in the manner envisioned by 
Congress. 
In 2010, the Supreme Court also expressed concern about this 
inconsistency, remarking on the number of veterans’ cases heard at the 
CAVC that were awarded EAJA fees.  This exchange occurred during an 
oral argument regarding EAJA fees at the Social Security 
Administration: 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:—70 percent of the time the 
government’s position is substantially unjustified? 
MR. YANG: In cases—in the VA context, the number is not quite that 
large, but there’s a substantial number of cases at the court of appeals – 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: What number would you accept? 
MR. YANG: It was, I believe, in the order of either 50 or maybe 
slightly more than 50 percent.  It might be 60.  But the number is 
substantial that you get a reversal, and in almost all of those cases, 
EAJA – 
                                                            
 82.   See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1), (d)(2)(F) (2012). 
 83.   Id. § 2412(d)(1)(A)–(B), (d)(3). 
 84.   Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). 
 85.   This number reflects the number of granted EAJA applications granted in 2008 divided by 
the total merits decisions in 2008 excluding extraordinary relief claims: 2433/3480 = 69.9%. 
 86.   U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS, ANNUAL REPORT 1 (1997-2007) 
https://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/documents/Annual_Reports_2007.pdf [https://perma.cc/D82B-
7AYL].  This number excludes those decisions made on petitions for extraordinary relief. 
 87.   Id.  This number excludes those decisions made on petitions for extraordinary relief. 
 88.   Id. 
 89.   Id.  
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CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, that’s really startling, isn’t it?  In 
litigating with veterans, the government more often than not takes a 
position that is substantially unjustified? 
MR. YANG: It is an unfortunate number, Your Honor.  And it is—it’s 
accurate.90 
In 2017, the most recent year numbers are available, the situation is 
worse.  Of the 3,619 appeals that were decided on the merits at the court, 
86% of these decisions remanded in whole or in part the decisions of the 
Board.91  In addition, a whopping 80% of the cases decided were 
awarded EAJA fees.92  Overall, the decisions being made at the Regional 
Office level are no more encouraging if one reviews them for compliance 
with the law.  In 2017, the Board remanded or reversed 73% of the 
appeals of Regional Office decisions.93 
If the quality of Board decisions is measured in terms of content, 
then these numbers94 represent a concerning trend that the author has 
addressed in detail in prior articles.95  While the number of reversals in 
2017 (3,112) is a small fraction of the decisions the Board makes 
denying a veteran benefits (11,371), the 86% reversal rate of all appeals 
decided in one year is no less alarming.96  As one attorney who has been 
practicing in the veterans law arena for decades noted, “the VA’s appeal 
process . . . has been unable to ‘fully and sympathetically develop the 
veteran’s claim to its optimum before deciding it on the merits’ in 4 out 
                                                            
 90.   Transcript of Oral Argument at 52, Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586 (2010) (No. 08-1322), 
2010 WL 603696.  
 91.   U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS, ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2017) 
https://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/documents/FY2017AnnualReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/HXX8-
5NWV].  This number is the total number of appeals excluding appeals dismissed voluntarily, for 
lack of jurisdiction or timeliness, or for default. 
 92.   Id.  This number reflects the total number of EAJA appeals divided by the total number of 
merits appeals excluding voluntary dismissals and dismissals for lack of jurisdiction or timeliness, or 
for default: 2882/3619 = 79.6%. 
 93.   U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, BD. OF VETERANS’ APPEALS, ANNUAL REPORT 
FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2017 30 (2017) https://www.bva.va.gov/docs/Chairmans_Annual_Rpts/BVA 
2017AR.pdf [https://perma.cc/DY8S-F5K7].  The Board reports making 52,661 decisions in 2017 of 
which 73.4% approved the veteran’s appeal of the VARO’s decision or remanded the decision for 
further development. 
 94.   See id.  For instance, in 2017 the Board decided approximately 52,261 cases and 
ultimately denied only 11,371 of these.  It is this smaller number of cases that represent appealable 
decisions of the Board.   
 95.   See, e.g., Stacey-Rae Simcox, Thirty Years After Walters the Mission is Clear, the 
Execution is Muddled: A Fresh Look at the Supreme Court’s Decision to Deny Veterans the Due 
Process Right to Hire Attorneys in the VA Benefits Process, 84 U. CIN. L. REV. 671 (2016). 
 96.   See U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, BD. OF VETERANS’ APPEALS, ANNUAL REPORT 
FISCAL YEAR, supra note 93 at 29 and text accompanying note 94.  
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of every 10 cases appealed to the [Board] since 1992 through 2013.”97  
Discouragingly, this reversal rate has remained relatively unchanged in 
the thirty years of judicial review of the VA’s adjudication process. 
As Judge Allen noted, it is true that the rate of remands is not the 
only way to examine the impact of judicial review, but it does provide 
one of the only objective standards available.98  Taking into 
consideration the quality of the rationale given for the VA’s decisions 
also raises concerns.  One veterans’ advocate remarked that the fact that 
the lack of clear guidance in a number of areas of veterans law has led to 
the inability of the VA to make consistent and accurate decisions.99  The 
Disabled American Veterans expressed concern in 2015 that the rating 
decisions emanating from the Regional Offices still lack “substantive 
information for claimants to understand how VA arrived at its decision 
on a claim for benefits.”100  While these comments are not representative 
of every decision made at the VARO and Board, they are indicative of 
the continuing perception among veterans that the VA engages in 
arbitrary decision-making without explanation, despite judicial review. 
In the content of the court’s opinions, one can find evidence that the 
struggle to maintain a non-adversarial system, and yet acknowledge that 
attorneys are now a larger part of that system, is real.  For example, in 
2014, the CAVC played referee between the Board and attorneys 
representing Mr. Nohr, a veteran.101  The attorneys wanted to ask 
questions of the medical examiner the VA procured and relied upon 
when deciding Mr. Nohr’s claims.102  In asking questions, the attorneys 
referred to the questions as “interrogatories.”  The Board refused to 
require the examiner, Dr. Feng, to answer the request.  The CAVC 
suggested in its dicta that: 
the Board’s refusal to send Mr. Nohr’s questions and request for 
documents to Dr. Feng and its corresponding statement stressing the 
nonadversarial nature of the VA benefits system looks like a knee-jerk 
reaction based upon Mr. Nohr’s characterization of his questions as 
                                                            
 97.   Veterans’ Dilemma: Navigating the Appeals System for Veterans Claims: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Disability Assistance and Memorial Affairs of the H. Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 
114th Cong. 114 (2015) [hereinafter Veterans’ Dilemma] (statement of Kenneth M. Carpenter, Esq., 
Founding Member, National Organization of Veterans Advocates). 
 98.   See Allen, supra note 50, at 376. 
 99.   Veterans’ Dilemma, supra note 97, at 107 (statement of Barton F. Stichman, Esq., Joint 
Executive Director, National Veterans Legal Services Program). 
 100.   Id. at 87 (statement of Paul R. Varela, Assistant National Legislative Director, Disabled 
American Veterans). 
 101.   See Nohr v. McDonald, 27 Vet. App. 124 (2014). 
 102.   Id. at 125, 127–28. 
530 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 67 
“interrogatories.”  With the increasing involvement of attorneys at the 
administrative level and the corresponding complexity that attorney 
involvement can generate, the veterans bar and VA must proceed with 
caution so as not to unravel Congress’s desire to preserve and maintain 
the unique character and structure of the paternalistic, nonadversarial 
veterans’ benefits system.103 
The CAVC then ordered the Board to have the examiner answer the 
questions asked as part of the VA’s duty to assist a veteran.104 
In decision after decision, the CAVC has systematically reminded 
the Board and VARO of its non-adversarial nature and its duty to assist 
the veteran.  Official statistics on the number of remands of Board 
decisions due to a failure to adhere to these standards are difficult to 
obtain.  This is partially due to the fact that the court itself decides 
relatively few of the appeals to the court on the merits due to large 
numbers of settlements. The CAVC Rules of Court mandate that 
veterans’ counsel and attorneys representing the Secretary from the 
Office of General Counsel enter into settlement conferences.105  Large 
numbers of cases “decided” by the CAVC are actually the result of these 
settlement conferences.  Determining why the cases were settled by joint 
agreement of the parties to remand is difficult without completely 
exhuming each and every one of the motions for joint remand on the 
CAVC docket, which in 2017 alone would equate to approximately 
1,940 veterans’ cases.106 
However, while the CAVC does not provide official statistics 
regarding how many cases are voluntarily remanded by the Office of 
General Counsel, it is possible to extrapolate approximate numbers from 
the number of CAVC decisions made on the merits of each case and 
finding that the VA failed in its duty to assist the veteran.  In FY 2017, 
the CAVC had five full-time judges deciding cases and issuing orders.107  
Those five judges decided approximately 1,180 cases and petitions on 
                                                            
 103.   Id. at 131. 
 104.   Id. at 134–35. 
 105.   U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS, COURT RULES, RULE 33(c).   
 106.   U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS, supra note 91, at 2.  The CAVC 
received 4,095 total appeals in 2017.  Of those 4,095 appeals, 499 were affirmed on the merits, 160 
were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction or timeliness, 101 were dismissed for default, and 215 were 
voluntarily dismissed—leaving 3,120 total cases remanded by the CAVC in FY 2017.  Of these, 
1,180 were the result of a judge’s decisions on the merits leaving 1,940 cases the result of some type 
of motion for remand. 
 107.   U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS, ANNUAL REPORT 5 (2016) 
https://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/documents/FY2016AnnualReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/UBB3-
BYA4]; see U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS, supra note 91, at 5 (reporting 4,296 
total cases filed in 2017 and 859 filings per active judge). 
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the merits.108  Of those 1,180 cases, approximately 430 of them vacated 
the decision of the Board and remanded in whole or in part veterans’ 
claims based on a violation of the VA’s duty to assist.109  That equates to 
approximately 36% of the cases remanded by the CAVC specifically 
because the Board failed to adhere to the non-adversarial system created 
by Congress.  While admittedly this is an unscientific manner in which to 
gather statistics, practitioners at the CAVC would argue that in their 
experience, the number of cases in which the Board failed in its duty to 
assist is actually much higher.  One would have hoped that after three 
decades of reminders to adhere to the non-adversarial system, the 
number of times the VA failed to do so would be much lower.110 
2. The Fear of Delay in the System 
The length of time it takes the VA to make decisions on veterans’ 
claims has been a constant source of irritation for veterans and the VA 
alike.  Even before the judicial review of the Board was established, 
there were complaints that the system just took too long in deciding 
veteran’s claims.111  By 1993, the VA was able to begin pointing the 
finger at the CAVC for delays.  While testifying before Congress, a VA 
official warned that an “activist court” had caused their processing times 
on initial claims to balloon from 120 days in 1990 to 175 days three 
years later.112  Congress, the VA, and those who help veterans were 
already referring to the delays as a backlog.113  Some pointed to the 
difficulty the VA was having translating court decisions to lay persons 
working at the Regional Office level making initial decisions on veterans 
claims.114  However, the VA General Counsel office declared that by 
1993 the VA had an effective system in place to communicate changes in 
                                                            
 108.   Id. 
 109.   This number was arrived at by searching for all merit opinions of the CAVC that vacated 
or remanded the decision of the Board for violations of the Duty to Assist from 10/1/2016 to 
9/30/2017.  
 110.   See generally Ridgway, supra note 44 (providing an interesting view of the reason for high 
remands from the VA’s perspective).  
 111.   See Hearings, supra note 24, at 225 (statement of Richard O’Dell, Chairman of the 
Committee on Advocacy, Vietnam Veterans of America).   
 112.   S. 616, Veterans’ Compensation COLA Act of 1993, and Oversight of VA Claims 
Processing and Adjudication: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 103d Cong. 20 
(1993) (statement of R. John Vogel, Deputy Undersecretary for Benefits, Department of Veterans 
Affairs). 
 113.   See generally id. at 33–35 (discussing the increasing number of claims awaiting decision 
for an increasing amount of time). 
 114.   Id. at 2 (statement of Sen. John D. Rockefeller, Chairman, S. Comm. on Veterans’ 
Affairs). 
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the law to its employees.115  Independently, the Veterans Claims 
Adjudication Commission’s 1996 report found that with the creation of 
the CAVC, the average time it took for the VARO and Board to process 
claims doubled.116  By 2012, the average time it took to receive an initial 
decision from the VA was reported as 260 days.117  The 2012 numbers 
showed that there were “856,092 pending compensation rating claims, of 
which 568,043 (66 percent) were considered backlogged [pending over 
125 days].”118  A push in 2013 to focus on making decisions on initial 
claims within 125 days to reduce the almost 600,000 waiting claims 
required mandatory overtime of rank and file VA employees.119 
This focus on completing initial claims faster forced the backlog on 
decisions into the appellate side of adjudication at the VA.  From 2009–
2011, the time it took for the VA to initiate its first response to a 
veteran’s appeal of a decision increased 57% from 293 days to 460 
days.120  In 2015, the average veteran would wait 1,380 days to have their 
appeal decided by the Board.121  A 2018 VA Inspector General report 
found that the average time a veteran now waits to have an appeal 
favorably decided at the Board and implemented is 2,213 days—a little 
over six years!122  If a remand to the VARO is required—which happens 
in 43% of the cases the Board decides123—another 943 days could be 
added to the process, making the total time a veteran is kept waiting 
3,156 days—over eight and a half years.124 
Were the fears of veterans’ advocates that the court would delay 
benefits to veterans founded?  Frankly, it is difficult to say exactly how 
much impact the CAVC has had on the delays in the system.  The issue 
of delay at the VA is not a new phenomenon.  In 1988, before the CAVC 
                                                            
 115.   Id. at 25 (statement of Mr. Thompson, Assistant General Counsel, Department of Veterans 
Affairs). 
 116.   THE VETERAN, supra note 72, at 168. 
 117.   U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-89, VETERANS’ DISABILITY BENEFITS: 
TIMELY PROCESSING REMAINS A DAUNTING CHALLENGE 1 (2012).  
 118.   Id. at 9. 
 119.   David Wood, VA Backlog Reform is Difficult But on Track, Secretary Eric Shinseki Says, 
HUFFINGTON POST (May 22, 2013, 12:07 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/22/va-
backlog_n_3312744.html [https://perma.cc/EEW5-XW9J]. 
 120.   U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 117, at 10. 
 121.   Michael P. Allen, Justice Delayed; Justice Denied? Causes and Proposed Solutions 
Concerning Delays in the Award of Veterans’ Benefits, 5 U. MIAMI NAT’L SEC. & ARMED CONF. L. 
REV. 1, 11–12 (2015). 
 122.   OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., OFF. OF AUDITS & EVALUATIONS, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS 
AFF., REVIEW OF TIMELINESS OF THE APPEALS PROCESS 4 (2018), 
https://www.va.gov/oig/pubs/VAOIG-16-01750-79.pdf [https://perma.cc/LN3G-GHCQ].  
 123.   U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 93.  
 124.   OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 122. 
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was created by passage of the VJRA, the Chief Benefits Director of the 
VA attempted to explain the problems VA was having with timely 
processing veterans claims to a frustrated Congress: “There are twenty-
eight standards in our timeliness measurement system.  As of January 31, 
1988, we were meeting an acceptable level in only five of them.”125 
The reasons for the current delay and backlog seem to be varied.  In 
2018, judicial review is no longer viewed as the primary reason for delay 
in the system.  Observers point to the fact that the sheer number of 
claims the VA has had to process over the past two decades has been on 
the rise, sparked primarily by Vietnam-era veterans retiring and Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and Global War on Terrorism veterans leaving the service 
in large numbers.126  For instance, in 2008 the VA processed nearly 
900,000 claims for disability compensation.127  In 2011, the VA 
completed over 1 million claims.128  At the end of Fiscal Year 2017, the 
last year for which official numbers are available in VA reports, the VA 
processed 1.4 million claims.129  There is no doubt that the workload has 
increased, but former VA Secretary Eric Shinseki indicated that more 
VA employees were not necessarily the answer to processing the 
growing numbers.130  Despite this admission, Congress increased the 
VA’s budget in 2015 to hire more employees to handle these claims.131  
And while that worked for a brief time, pending claims numbers were 
                                                            
 125.   See S. REP. NO. 100-342, at 30–31 (1988). 
 126.   See generally Allen, supra note 121, at 10 (Discussing the impact of large numbers of 
veterans applying for benefits and its impact on the VA’s processing of benefits.). 
 127.   U.S. DEP’T. OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, VETERANS BENEFITS ADMINISTRATION, FY 2008 
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 2 (2008), https://www.va.gov/finance/afr/index.asp 
[https://perma.cc/Q8VP-HQ6R] (click “Archive” link under the “Fiscal Year 2008” bullet point in 
the “Prior Years Published Reports” section).  
 128.   U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 117, at 9. 
 129.   U.S. DEP’T. OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, FY 2019 / FY 2017 ANNUAL PERFORMANCE PLAN 
AND REPORT 33 (2018), https://www.va.gov/oei/docs/VA2019appr.pdf [https://perma.cc/93T5-
FUMT]. 
 130.   Secretary Shinseki had this exchange with interviewer Candy Crowley on CNN in 2013:  
CROWLEY: But is there something he can do for you? Does it need more people? Do 
you need more processors? Do you need more accountability for the processors? What do 
you need? SHINSEKI: In the past four years, if you look at our budget for V.A., a 40 
percent increase our budgets at a time when other departments have gone through belt 
tightening. Someone once told me that show me your budget and I’ll show you what you 
value. I think very clearly from this president the growth in our budgets reflect where he 
places his value.  
State of the Union with Candy Crowley (CNN television broadcast Mar. 24, 2013), 
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1303/24/sotu.02.html [https://perma.cc/3GD3-MPYX].  
 131.   VA Enters Stretch on Goals for Homelessness, Claims Backlog, NBC NEWS (Nov. 11, 
2015, 10:43 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/va-hospital-scandal/va-enters-stretch-goals-
homelessness-claims-backlog-n461511 [https://perma.cc/25PG-JK3Q].  
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steadily increasing again into another backlog by 2017.132 
Other reasons offered for delay have included changes in the 
presumptions that allow the VA to provide compensation for veterans 
suffering from certain health conditions without requiring the veterans to 
definitively prove the conditions’ connection to their service.  The 
Secretary of the VA granted three such presumptions for Vietnam 
veterans exposed to Agent Orange between 2010 and 2012, which the 
VA pointed to as a contributing factor in increasing claims-processing 
times.133  The complexity of conditions claimed, such as traumatic brain 
injuries, and large numbers of untrained and inexperienced claims 
processers hired to reduce the backlog have also been identified as 
contributing to the problem.134  However, it has been argued that the 
issues seen in the VA are no more complex than those seen in the Social 
Security Administration where initial decisions also are made by 
laypersons employed at the agency.135 
However, in the past decade, the VA’s most oft-cited reason for the 
delays in the system is the non-adversarial nature of the VA itself.  The 
VA has pointed to the codification of this paternalistic system under the 
Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000,136 which mandates the 
assistance the VA owes to veterans who file a claim, as the primary 
“problem” it faces in delivering timely claims decisions in both the 
original decision and appellate processes.  Some statutory duties the VA 
has to help a veteran through the claims process include requesting 
federally-held records pertaining to a veteran’s claim, requesting 
privately held medical records on behalf of the veteran, providing the 
veteran with a medical examination, and imposing the duty to read a 
veteran’s claim sympathetically.137  Generally, these duties are referred 
to as the VA’s “duty to assist” a veteran. 
To be certain, fulfilling the duty to assist takes time.  As Judge Allen 
noted 
                                                            
 132.   Leo Shane III, Once a Fixed Issue, the VA Disability Claims Backlog is on the Rise Again, 
MILITARY TIMES (Mar. 24, 2017), https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2017/03/ 
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 133.   U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 117, at 13. 
 134.   Id. at 11. 
 135.   Michael J. Wishnie, “A Boy Gets Into Trouble”: Service Members, Civil Rights, and 
Veterans’ Law Exceptionalism, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1709, 1736 (2017). 
 136.   Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-475, 114 Stat. 2096 (Nov. 9, 
2000). 
 137.   38 U.S.C. §§ 5103A (2012 & Supp. 2017), 5107 (2012), 5109 (2012 & Supp. 2017); See 
McGee v. Peake, 511 F.3d 1352, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Cook v. Principi, 318 F.3d 1334, 1337–38 
n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
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with any additional layer of procedure comes a corresponding period of 
delay. For example, with each additional hearing comes time to 
prepare, have the hearing, and eventually render a decision. And with 
the duties of notice and assistance, a finding that such a duty has not 
been complied with will almost always lead to a remand. Indeed, 
allowing a veteran to submit additional evidence throughout the appeal 
process is a benefit to a veteran but also adds delay as the new evidence 
needs to be processed.138 
In 2007, an administrator at the VA testified before Congress that the 
backlog in claims was partially due to the requirements of the VCAA 
that the VA schedule medical examinations and notify the veteran of the 
evidence required to prove their claims.139  The VA has also claimed that 
it takes 157 days of processing time (in 2011) to request records for 
veterans when processing initial claims.140 
The delay issue is front and center not only at Congress, but in 
jurisprudence as well.  Recently, a spate of lawsuits concerning the 
delays at the VA have come before both the CAVC and the Federal 
Circuit.141  These cases have argued that the delays at the VA are a 
violation of due process, and that the CAVC has a duty to order the 
Secretary of the VA to act when decisions on claims are “unlawfully 
withheld or unreasonably delayed.”142  While the due process 
considerations will be addressed in the following Section, a discussion of 
the CAVC’s willingness to order the Secretary to move more quickly and 
cut wait times is well placed here. 
In an interesting crossroads of the tensions between providing a 
veteran-friendly, paternalistic system and acknowledging the VA’s 
assertions that delay in such a system is quite impossible to avoid, the 
CAVC had created its own standard for determining the requirements for 
when a writ of mandamus should be issued by the court to order the 
Secretary to more quickly adjudicate a veteran’s claims.143  The writ of 
mandamus would require the Secretary to take actions on a veteran’s 
                                                            
 138.   Allen, supra note 121, at 18. 
 139.   Personal Costs of the US Department of Veterans Affairs Claims Backlog: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Disability Assistance and Memorial Affairs of the H. Comm on Veterans’ Affairs, 
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 140.   U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 117, at 2. 
 141.   Rose v. O’Rourke, 891 F.3d 1366, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Martin v. O’Rourke, 891 F.3d 
1338 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Monk v. Shulkin, 855 F.3d 1312, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
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F.3d at 1348. 
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claim when that action is unreasonably delayed.144  The CAVC referred 
to the test it used to determine unreasonable delay as the Costanza 
standard and required the veteran to demonstrate that “the delay he 
complains of is so extraordinary, given the demands and resources of the 
Secretary, that the delay amounts to an arbitrary refusal to act, and not 
the product of a burdened system.”145  As the Federal Circuit noted, 
“[t]here is little to be said about this standard’s origin.”146 
The CAVC’s choice to apply an arbitrary-refusal-to-act standard was 
an interesting one in light of the nature of the pro-veteran system.  The 
CAVC was in the minority of courts choosing to use this standard.147  
Additionally, using the Costanza standard “inevitably favor(s) the 
Secretary because the standard considers the ‘demands and resources of 
the Secretary.’”148  After twenty years of using the Costanza standard, a 
challenge was inevitable. 
In 2018, the Federal Circuit heard the consolidated claims of nine 
individual veterans concerning delay at the VA.  The Appellants argued 
that the CAVC should use the standard that many other federal courts use 
to determine unreasonable delay, referred to as the TRAC standard, as 
opposed to the less favorable and narrower Costanza standard.149  Under 
TRAC, a claim of unreasonable delay is analyzed to determine “whether 
the agency’s delay is so egregious as to warrant mandamus”150 using six 
factors: 
(1) the time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by a 
“rule of reason”; (2) where Congress has provided a timetable or other 
indication of the speed with which it expects the agency to proceed in 
the enabling statute, that statutory scheme may supply content for this 
rule of reason; (3) delays that might be reasonable in the sphere of 
economic regulation are less tolerable when human health and welfare 
are at stake; (4) the court should consider the effect of expediting 
delayed action on agency activities of a higher or competing priority; 
(5) the court should also take into account the nature and extent of the 
interests prejudiced by delay; and (6) the court need not find “any 
impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude” in order to hold that 
                                                            
 144.   Martin, 891 F.3d at 1344.  
 145.   Costanza, 12 Vet. App. at 134. 
 146.   Martin, 891 F.3d at 1344. 
 147.   Brief of Amicus Curiae Nat’l Law Sch. Veterans Clinic Consortium at 5–6, Monk v. 
Wilkie, (No. 15-1280), Vet. App. (2017). 
 148.   Id. at 6 (citing Costanza, 12 Vet. App. at 134).   
 149.   Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC (TRAC), 750 F.2d 70, 76 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
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agency action is unreasonably delayed.151 
The Federal Circuit agreed with Appellants that the TRAC standards 
are “a more balanced approach” because it encompasses a review of both 
the veterans’ interests and the burdens on the VA.152  The Federal Circuit 
spent the majority of its discussion on the first elements of the TRAC 
standard, the “rule of reason” analysis.  The Federal Circuit explained 
that while it is reasonable to expect complex decision-making, such as 
preparation of a Statement of the Case, to take time, the delay is 
unexplainable when considering periods of decision-making that are 
“due to the agency’s failure to perform certain ministerial tasks.”153  For 
instance, the Federal Circuit noted that during several steps of the 
process of an appeal, the VA could not explain why delay exists: 
Once the veteran files a Form 9 (appeal to the Board), the VA 
completes a Certification of Appeal. . . it is unclear to us why this two-
and-a-half-hour certification process takes an average of 773 days to 
complete—and the government has not provided an explanation.  And 
the average 321-day delay that occurs when the VA transfers the 
certified appeal to the BVA is even more mysterious.  The government, 
again, has not explained the cause of this delay, even though the 
transfer process appears to consist of simply transferring appellate 
records.154 
The Federal Circuit also noted that TRAC factors three and five allow 
the CAVC to consider the specific effects of delay on individual 
veterans, while the fourth factor allows a balancing of the VA’s burden 
under large numbers of claims.155  The Federal Circuit believed that 
following the TRAC standards will allow the CAVC to evaluate these 
claims of unreasonable delay in a more balanced manner on a case-by-
case basis without setting arbitrary deadlines on the VA to complete 
actions.156 
While veterans celebrate the victory in Martin, the outcome is yet 
another demonstration of the Wild West mentality of veterans law.  
Martin shows that well-timed advocacy can overturn law that has been 
observed by the CAVC for decades.  This topic is important and will be 
discussed further below.  Due to the recency of the Federal Circuit’s 
                                                            
 151.   Martin, 891 F.3d at 1344–45 (quoting TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80). 
 152.   Id. at 1345. 
 153.   Id. at 1346. 
 154.   Id. at 1341. 
 155.   Id. at 1346–47. 
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decision that the TRAC elements should be used by the CAVC, there are 
very few decisions implementing the TRAC factors in a case of delay at 
the VA yet, so it is something for observers to carefully watch for in the 
coming years.  Hopefully, the use of this new standard of review 
regarding delay in VA decision-making will allow the CAVC to make 
more meaningful decisions on a case-by-case basis to stop the long 
periods of unexplainable delay in VA decision-making. 
Finally, before leaving the topic of delay in the VA adjudication 
system, it would be wise to remind the reader that the discussion of delay 
is not merely an academic one.  Circuit Judge Moore discussed the 
importance of delay in his concurring opinion in Martin: 
The men and women in these cases protected this country and the 
freedoms we hold dear; they were disabled in the service of their 
country; the least we can do is properly resolve their disability claims 
so that they have the food and shelter necessary for survival.  It takes 
on average six and a half years for a veteran to challenge a VBA 
determination and get a decision on remand.  God help this nation if it 
took that long for these brave men and women to answer the call to 
serve and protect.  We owe them more.157 
3. Increased Due Process and “Uncharted Waters” 
Veterans’ advocates and supporters hoped that with the advent of 
judicial review, veterans would be afforded more due process in the VA 
adjudication system and that they would be treated more equitably.158  In 
a review of the past decade of veterans law and due process, the most 
impactful court decision has to be the Federal Circuit’s decision in 
Cushman v. Shinseki, which held that a veteran’s entitlement to disability 
benefits is a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment.159  However, since Cushman was decided in 2009, the 
Federal Circuit and the CAVC have avoided the application of a due 
process analysis to what are arguably the biggest issues in veterans’ 
benefits in the last decade: the backlog of claims and delay in the system.  
Perhaps the use of the word “avoid” is too harsh of an assessment on the 
courts’ willingness to intervene.  It may be more accurate to say that the 
courts have been “prevented” from deciding such issues.  As CAVC 
Judges Lance and Hagel noted in 2012: 
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It is true that the Court rarely grants a petition for extraordinary relief.  
However, it should not be assumed from this fact that petitions are an 
ineffective tool for obtaining relief.  The reality is that the Court 
regularly orders the Secretary to respond to a petition that sets forth a 
well-pleaded complaint that the processing of a claim has been 
improperly delayed.  When the Court issues such an order, the great 
majority of the time the Secretary responds by correcting the problem 
within the short time allotted for a response, and the petition is 
dismissed as moot because the relief sought has been obtained.160 
Recently however, a new wave of litigation at the CAVC and 
Federal Circuit has positioned the issue front and center for the CAVC 
and offered it another chance to consider the issue decisively.  One prime 
example of this litigation is the case of Mr. Conley Monk.  Mr. Monk is a 
Vietnam veteran who was denied service connection for his Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder and filed his Notice of Disagreement with the 
VARO in July 2013.161  After twenty months of waiting, Mr. Monk filed 
a petition with the CAVC for a writ of mandamus ordering the VARO to 
issue a Statement of the Case and claiming that the VARO’s failure to do 
so was a constructive denial of Mr. Monk’s benefits.162  The CAVC 
denied his petition in a 2015 decision because Mr. Monk was unable to 
meet the Costanza standard showing that the Secretary’s delay was 
equivalent to an arbitrary refusal to act.163  Additionally, Mr. Monk asked 
that the CAVC “compel the Secretary promptly to decide his claim and 
that of thousands of similarly situated veterans who confront significant 
financial or medical hardship while awaiting a VA decision.”164  The 
CAVC rejected this request,165 citing CAVC decisions reaching back to 
1991 holding that class actions at the CAVC were impossible to 
adjudicate because: 
[the CAVC] lacks the power to adopt a rule of the kind proposed for 
class actions, . . .and, in any event, that (2) such a procedure in this 
appellate court would be highly unmanageable, and that (3) such a 
procedure is unnecessary in light of the binding effect of this Court’s 
                                                            
 160.   Young v. Shinseki, 25 Vet. App. 201, 215 (2012) (Lance, J., dissenting).  
 161.   See Monk v. Shulkin, 855 F.3d 1312, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Separately, Mr. Monk was 
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published opinions as precedent in pending and future cases.166 
Mr. Monk appealed this decision to the Federal Circuit.167  By the 
time the Federal Circuit decided Mr. Monk’s case, the VA had awarded 
him 100% disability for his claimed conditions.168  The Federal Circuit 
found that the portion of Mr. Monk’s case requesting that a writ of 
mandamus be issued to force the Secretary to act upon his specific claims 
was mooted by the decision.169  However, the Federal Circuit found that 
the question of a class action was not mooted and held that the CAVC 
does in fact have the authority and jurisdiction to adjudicate class action 
suits.170  The Federal Circuit relied in part on the All Writs Act’s171 
authority to aggregate claims, which it found applied to the CAVC.172  
Additionally, the Federal Circuit found no inherent prohibition on 
hearing class action suits in the VJRA, which established the CAVC’s 
jurisdictional authority.173  The Federal Circuit remanded Mr. Monk’s 
case to the CAVC and allowed the CAVC to determine the 
appropriateness of aggregation in this instance and the procedures that 
would best effectuate that type of litigation.174 
On remand, the CAVC noted that “we are all in uncharted waters.”175  
The CAVC acknowledged and noted its insufficient procedures and 
interest in the participation of a number of stakeholders in the 
determination of when a class action is appropriate and other issues 
surrounding Mr. Monk’s case.176  Therefore, the CAVC requested that 
the parties provide input on twelve questions.177  The CAVC received 
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the CAVC requested input on these twelve questions:  
1. What framework should the Court use to determine whether class/aggregate action is 
warranted (for example, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23; an omnibus rule (see, e.g., 
Office of the Special Masters of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims); or another 
framework) to reflect the unique nature of this appellate court? 
2. Are there likely difficulties in managing the putative class, and, if so, should such 
difficulties be a factor that the Court considers in certifying a class? 
3. If the Court decides to certify a class, how should it select counsel for the class?  
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seven amici briefs on these twelve questions from various groups 
including The National Law School Veterans Clinic Consortium,178 The 
National Organization of Veterans Advocates, veterans organizations, a 
group of interested administrative law professors, a group of varied 
organizations including a homeless advocacy network, and two former 
General Counsels of the VA.179 
                                                            
. . . 
4. How should the Court determine whether a putative class member demonstrates 
medical or financial hardship, as defined by 38 U.S.C. § 7107(a)(2)(B) and (C)? 
5. Is this Court able to make the findings necessary to certify a class, given that 38 U.S.C. 
§ 7261(c) prohibits the Court from making factual findings in the first instance? . . . 
Assuming the Court would not be barred from making such findings, what mechanism(s) 
should the Court use to do so (e.g., mandatory disclosures, preliminary record by the 
Secretary, discovery, etc.)? 
6. If the Court decides to certify a class, should the Court direct any notice to the class 
members? In answering this question, please also address whether class members should 
have the right to opt out of the class and, if so, what notice should be provided on that 
matter. Also, should the Court adopt an opt-in approach instead? . . . 
7. How would a class action be superior to a precedential decision from this Court in 
fairly and efficiently adjudicating the due process issue raised by the petitioner? Does the 
type of relief the petitioner seeks from the Court play a role in determining whether the 
Court should issue a precedential decision or certify a class? 
8. How should the Court define the “extraordinary” circumstances that warrant the 
issuance of a writ of mandamus when the petitioner seeks aggregate resolution?  
. . . 
9. How should the Court assess whether VA’s delay in adjudicating appeals constitutes a 
violation of constitutional due process? Does the analysis of whether there has been a 
deprivation of due process differ from the analysis of whether VA adjudication of appeals 
has been “unreasonably delayed”?  
. . . 
10. How does the absence of congressionally mandated VA deadlines factor into the 
Court’s due process determination of whether delay in VA adjudications constitutes a due 
process violation?  
. . . 
11. If the Court were to certify a class and grant the writ, what is the appropriate remedy? 
Please identify the sources of law, including specific VA laws, regulations, or policies, if 
any, that support the grant of the requested relief. Additionally, if the relief requested by 
the petitioner creates delays for other VA claimants, should this be a factor that the Court 
considers before granting the requested relief? 
12. Would the administration of the relief requested require individual determinations if 
the class-wide allegations are proven? If yes, what is the Court’s role in monitoring 
compliance with the writ?   
Id. at *2–4. 
 178.   See NATIONAL LAW STUDENTS VETERANS CLINIC CONSORTIUM, www.nlsvcc.org 
[https://perma.cc/5FZ6-C9GD] (“The NLSVCC is a collaborative effort of the nation’s law school 
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 179.   Monk v. Shulkin, 2017 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 1543.  These briefs may be obtained 
on the CAVC’s website.  See Case Search, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS, 
https://efiling.uscourts.cavc.gov/cmecf/servlet/TransportRoom?servlet=CaseSearch.jsp 
[https://perma.cc/CHR6-FSAR] (enter “15-1280” in the “Case Number / Range” box, click 
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Question eight, regarding the circumstances appropriate for a writ of 
mandamus, was subsequently answered by the Federal Circuit’s opinion 
in Martin, already discussed.180  Regarding questions relating to a due 
process analysis of the delay in the VA system, the possibility that delay 
does result in a due process violation is not a new one.  The Supreme 
Court has held that delay can violate a claimant’s Fifth Amendment 
rights.  The Court held that due process includes the opportunity to have 
one’s concerns heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful 
manner”181 and has found that delay of one hundred days in other 
administrative benefits contexts was too long to satisfy the Fifth 
Amendment’s requirements for procedural due process when 
withholding a claimant’s property rights.182  Amici and the parties agreed 
that the balancing test in Mathews v. Eldridge183 should be applied to any 
due process analysis of delay.184  The Mathews test considers three 
factors: (1) the nature and weight of the petitioner’s private interest, (2) 
the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest through existing 
procedures and the probable value of additional safeguards, and (3) the 
Government’s interest in maintaining the existing procedures.185 
The recommendations for how to create rules and procedures for 
class action suits, which were the bulk of questions the CAVC posited, 
resulted in the majority of the amici briefs.186  In January 2018, the 
CAVC issued an order acknowledging that there are very few appellate 
courts in the position of hearing class action suits.187  The CAVC then 
announced that it intended to follow the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
procedures for when it has authority to act as a trial court.188  In those 
instances, the Court uses the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 
and the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE).189 
On August 23, 2018, the CAVC issued an order in which it made no 
decision on the merits of the contentions in Monk.190  The order merely 
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ruled on the issue of class certification.191  The court, in a plurality, 
applied FRCP 23 and held that the proposed class of “all individuals who 
applied for and have been denied VA disability compensation benefits 
and have not received a decision from the Board of Veterans’ Appeals 
(Board) within 12 months of the date of filing a timely NOD” failed to 
meet the standards required for class certification.192  In particular, the 
court in reviewing the four prerequisites under FRCP 23(a) for class 
certification found that the proposed class failed to meet the prerequisite 
of a common question for the cause of the delay in adjudicating the 
veterans’ appeals.193  The court’s order that the petitioners failed to meet 
the commonality prerequisite prevented the court’s review of any of the 
other requirements of class certification. 
In analyzing the commonality requirement, the court noted that the 
Supreme Court in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes required the proposed 
class to demonstrate class members suffered the same injury, but in 
doing so cannot rely merely on the fact that all members suffer from the 
same violation of law.194  The requirement is more broadly read to 
require that the “common contention . . . is capable of classwide 
resolution . . . in one stroke.”195  Petitioners’ theory of commonality 
rested on the fact that some amount of time, in this instance over one 
year, is too long for the VA to take to decide an appeal.196  The reasons 
for the delay are inconsequential because the delay is “both 
unconstitutional and ‘unreasonable’ no matter the reason.”197 
In the plurality’s reasoning that no commonality exists, the opinion 
expends a large amount of energy parrying the dissent’s contentions that 
commonality does exist, and in doing so becomes an instructive read in 
the arguments and counter arguments to each point of view.198  
Therefore, it seems prudent to consider the dissent and the plurality’s 
response to its specific concerns. 
                                                            
 191.   Id. 
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The dissent notes that class certification is extremely important in 
regards to resolving the delay issue.  In support of this proposition, the 
dissent cited the Federal Circuit’s decision in Ebanks v. Shulkin, where 
the court “commented that it was uncomfortable with granting a writ in 
an individual case for ‘veterans who claim unreasonable delay in VA’s 
first-come-first-served queue . . .  without resolving the underlying 
problem of overall delay.’”199  The Federal Circuit then went on to 
suggest addressing the issue of delay by class action with aggregate 
relief.200  The dissent, in which two other judges concurred or dissented 
in part, primarily asserted that the plurality required the petitioners to 
meet “too high a bar” for certification due to “conflating resolution of the 
merits of the petitioners’ claims with the procedural question of 
commonality.”201  This conflation occurs because the plurality possess a 
“flawed understanding of the petitioners’ claims . . . not based on the 
petitioners’ theory of the case.”202 
The conflation comment stems from a disagreement regarding how 
deeply courts must explore the merits of petitioners’ claim.  If the 
determination of commonality in this case relies on the assertion of the 
petitioner that the cause of the unreasonable delay is a systemic problem, 
the reasons for delay would not matter and the inquiry regarding 
commonality can end.  This was the dissent’s position.203  The dissent 
asserted that the court can answer the question of whether the delay 
suffered by the petitioners was too long, either in terms of 
unreasonableness or resulting in a violation of one’s constitutional 
rights.204  The answer to either of these questions will affect every one of 
the petitioners in a similar fashion. 
If however the analysis requires a more detailed digging into the 
reason for each particular delay, a deeper inquiry drawing closer to the 
heart of the merits of the claim is necessary.205  The VA asserted that it 
was impossible to determine the reasonableness of delay without 
                                                            
 199.   Id. at 187 (Allen, J., dissenting) (citing Ebanks v. Shulkin, 877 F.3d 1037, 1039–40 (Fed. 
Cir. 2017)). 
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exploring the reason for delay in each appeals adjudication.206  Some 
reasons for delay may be due to the veteran’s request for a hearing, other 
adjudications may require the VA to comply with the duty to assist the 
veteran in obtaining evidence, and in yet others the delay may be caused 
by the difficulty of the claims on appeal.207 
The plurality agrees with the VA’s position, asserting that “the 
substantive law underscores that a central inquiry that must be resolved 
is whether the VA’s delay is unreasonable” and that the only way to 
determine reasonability is to consider the reasons for each individual 
veterans’ delayed adjudication.208  Because the petitioners could not 
point to one practice of the VA that leads to the delay, the court was left 
having to weigh individual reasons for the delay, thus negating the ability 
to rule on a common question that could resolve all cases in “one 
stroke.”209  “Our insistence that the petitioners identify the reasons for 
delay is so that we may determine whether commonality exists.”210 
The Monk dissent’s assessment of the impact of the plurality’s 
decision to avoid the merits of the issues and decline to certify a class in 
this case is insightful.  The dissent notes “[t]he plurality’s reading of the 
commonality requirement makes it functionally impossible to certify a 
class in many delay claims” and “in so doing . . . has effectively 
precluded the Court from playing a meaningful role in addressing the 
systemic deficiencies plaguing the veterans benefits system—at least for 
today.”211  If a bright light comes out of the court’s ultimate brushing 
aside of one of the most pressing issues of constitutionality regarding 
veterans’ benefits, it is that the entirety of the court agreed the CAVC 
will in the future consider utilizing class action procedures under the 
guidance of FRCP 23, at least until the court adopts its own aggregate 
procedures rules.212 
Other class action suits filed at the CAVC address various aspects of 
the VA adjudication system.  One such case, Skaar v. Wilkie, regarding 
veterans’ exposure to radiation, was recently argued en banc.213  In 
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February 2019, the CAVC issued a limited remand back to the Board to 
clarify an issue on the merits of the case before returning the case to the 
CAVC for a decision on class certification.214  The Skaar order was a 
surprise and not because it made no decision on class certification.  For 
years, the CAVC complied with its holding in Cleary v. Brown and 
relinquished jurisdiction of a case back to the Board on remand.215  By 
ordering a limited remand in Skaar the CAVC has once again changed 
the landscape of the practice of veterans law and actually overruled 
“more than 2 decades of Court caselaw and chang[ed] long-established 
procedural norms” regarding the CAVC’s jurisdiction.216  In a 
concurrence to the order, Chief Judge Davis encouraged the CAVC to 
grasp the “broad discretion to define the scope of its remand authority” 
that other Federal appellate courts exercise.217  The dissent to this order 
was concerned about, among other things, the sweeping aside of decades 
of precedent with little discussion and a potential overreaching of the 
CAVC’s statutory jurisdiction.218  The import of this sea change in the 
CAVC’s view of its own jurisdictional authority will be an interesting 
development to watch over time.  To be sure, retaining jurisdiction over 
the class for purposes of class certification will both spur the Board to 
make a decision on the merits of the case more quickly.  It will also 
avoid a tactic employed by the Secretary and discussed previously in this 
article—the VA making decisions in favor of veterans in order to prevent 
them from seeking remedy at the CAVC that may result in precedent. 
While the CAVC has not yet explicitly ordered how and when class 
actions will be utilized in the VA system, the use of this mechanism may 
finally be coming to fruition for advocates who have long seen this as a 
possible benefit of judicial review. 
4. Final Observations 
Judge Allen’s article analyzing the growth of the CAVC a decade 
ago was prescient in many ways.219  He foresaw that the class action 
mechanism would be desirous in a system overrun by delay.220  He also 
repeatedly commented on the uncertainty of veterans law when appellate 
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judicial decision-making is shared between the Federal Circuit and the 
CAVC.221  This tension creates “doctrinal confusion on matters of law” 
that results in “additional delays for veterans and other claimants.”222  
This type of confusion is on full display in Martin, a Federal Court 
decision which changed decades of CAVC precedent relied upon by 
thousands of veterans and their advocates.  Judge Allen also noted that 
the CAVC tended to limit its own authority to its detriment and was 
often disrespected in the larger legal system223—a position validated by 
the Federal Circuit’s decision in Monk. 
In 2017, Professor Michael Wishnie of Yale Law School noted that 
many of Judge Allen’s concerns in 2008 were still relevant a decade 
later.  Professor Wishnie argues that the CAVC itself has become 
“ghettoized”—cordoned off from other areas of law and afforded less 
status because of the nature of the court’s specialization.224  He suggests 
that a de-specialized system of judicial review would better serve the 
needs of veterans and help prevent some of the delay inherent in the 
CAVC’s limited judicial authority.225  Professor Allen suggested prior to 
joining the CAVC bench that elevating the CAVC to Article III status 
might well alleviate many of the concerns.226 
The observations of Judge Allen and Professor Wishnie are valid 
ones.  Indeed, the conversation regarding changes to judicial review is 
necessary to ensure that this unique system works to the benefit of the 
nation as it seeks to care for veterans.  However, this author believes that 
changes to the structure of judicial review are important to discuss but 
will ultimately amount to nothing if the administrative agency being 
reviewed is unable to implement the law as decided by any court 
regardless of its stature.  The VA’s decision-making process over the 
past thirty years demonstrates this problem.  Changes in the earliest 
stages of decision-making and appeals at the VA level seem to be the 
place where pioneers could actually change the system for the better.  
Others have agreed that changes in the beginning of the appeals process 
are not only desired, but necessary, thus setting the stage for the recent 
enactment of the most sweeping legislation to affect the way the VA 
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does business in thirty years.227 
III. SHIFTING FRONTIERS: THE VETERANS APPEALS IMPROVEMENT AND 
MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2017 
In 2016, the VA began efforts to propose legislative changes to its 
adjudicative system in Congress.228  The VA’s concern was that appeals 
procedures at the VA were “a collection of process that have 
accumulated over time, unlike any other appeals process in government.  
Layers of additions to the process have made it a complicated, opaque, 
unpredictable, and less veteran-friendly.  It makes adversaries out of 
veterans and VA and it is ridiculously slow . . . .”229 
To address these concerns, the VA gathered with eleven major 
stakeholders in the VA process and over the course of several months 
began to form a plan to reshape the appeals procedures.230  Those invited 
to the table included the “Big 6” Veterans Service Organizations231, 
National Veterans Legal Services Program, National Organization of 
Veterans Advocates, and county veterans service organizations.232  These 
sometimes all-day, closed-door sessions built upon work begun in 2014 
by a similar and smaller working group.233  In the end, the Veterans 
Appeals Improvement and Modernization Act of 2017 (Appeals 
Modernization Act) emerged from Congress and was signed into law by 
President Trump in August 2017.234  This legislation is truly a new 
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frontier for those who are willing and able to advance veterans’ rights 
and to shape the future. 
A. Major Aspects of the Appeals Modernization Act 
1. Multiple Paths 
The new legislation picks up in the VA process after the VARO 
makes its initial decision on a veteran’s claim.  If the veteran is 
dissatisfied with the VA decision in the current system of appeals, a 
period referred to as the “legacy system,” the veteran had to file a Notice 
of Disagreement,235 wait for the VA to issue a Statement of the Case,236 
and then file a VA Form 9 to appeal to the Board of Veterans’ 
Appeals.237  After these steps, the veteran had the opportunity to appeal 
to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims.238 
Under the Appeals Modernization Act, the veteran now has three 
different paths to appeal a VARO decision.  The whole process is very 
much like a “choose your own adventure” story.  There are multiple 
pathways, each with very different processes and ends.  According to the 
VA, “(t)he essential feature of this newly shaped design would be to step 
away from an appeals process that tries to do many unrelated things 
inside a single process and replace that with differentiated lanes, which 
give Veterans clear options after receiving an initial decision on a 
claim.”239 
The first path allows the veteran to file for a higher level review at 
the VARO itself.240  This request must be made within one year of the 
VARO decision.241  The review at this level is de novo, as it is in every 
level of appellate review created in the new legislation, but is limited to 
the evidence already in the record.242  The veteran has no opportunity in 
this review to submit additional evidence.  This evidentiary change is a 
sharp divergence from the legacy system.  The higher-level review will 
sound very similar to those already familiar with the VA adjudication 
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system as the Decision Review Officer (DRO) review.243  The DRO 
review in the current system is a supplemental level of review by a more-
experienced employee of the VA.  The VA’s implementation of the 
Appeals Modernization Act anticipates that the training and experience 
of the higher-level review will be commensurate with the current DRO 
positions, and that VAROs will initially fill the higher-level review 
positions with DROs.244 
The second path allows the veteran to file what the new legislation 
refers to as a “supplemental claim.”245  Supplemental claims are filed in 
two circumstances.  The first is when more than a year has passed since 
the original VARO decision was issued.246  Those veterans wishing to 
have the VARO adjudicate the claim again must file their own 
supplemental statement of the case.  In the legacy system, filing a claim 
with the VARO after a year had passed was referred to as “reopening a 
claim” and required new and material evidence to effect.  The 
supplemental claim requires “new and relevant evidence” to readjudicate 
the claim.247  As discussed in more detail below, this new standard is not 
intended to construe a higher standard than the previous “new and 
material” standard in the legacy system.248  The second circumstance 
when a supplemental claim may be filed is within a year of a decision by 
the higher-level authority, the Board, or the CAVC, in order to add new 
and relevant evidence to the file for further review of the claim.249  This 
new mechanism has a tremendous impact on the start date of a veteran’s 
disability award, if granted, (called the “effective date of the claim”), 
which will be discussed further below. 
The third option is to file a Notice of Disagreement,250 which like its 
previous incarnation in the legacy system must be filed within one year 
of the VARO decision and will lead the veteran to the Board for 
review.251  However, unlike the legacy system, the Statement of the Case 
and the VA Form 9 are now removed from the new system.  The Notice 
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of Disagreement is the only document the veteran must file to effectuate 
Board review. 
Once the claim arrives at the Board, there are three possible paths for 
the veteran to take.  The first path to Board review allows the veteran to 
have a hearing before the Board and to submit new evidence for the 
Board’s consideration.252  These hearings will be limited in the future to 
the Board’s primary location in Washington, D.C. or by video-
teleconference to a VA facility.253  The Board will consider evidence 
available to the VARO in its original decision and any evidence 
submitted by the veteran at the Board hearing and within ninety days 
following the hearing.254  The current option of having a hearing before a 
live judge who travels to the veteran’s local facility, a VA travel board, 
will no longer be available in the new system.  The second route allows 
the veteran to submit additional evidence to the Board without a 
hearing.255  In this instance, the veteran may submit evidence either with 
the Notice of Disagreement or within ninety days of filing the Notice of 
Disagreement.256  The final path is Board review without a hearing or 
additional evidence being submitted.257  In this review, the Board’s 
review of the veteran’s claim is limited to the evidence of record.258 
2. Changing Standards 
As mentioned, the previous standard of “new and material” evidence 
necessary to reopen a claim has been replaced with “new and relevant” 
evidence necessary to file a supplemental claim.259  Providing material 
evidence to the VA required a veteran to submit “evidence that, by itself 
or when considered with previous evidence of record, relates to an 
unestablished fact necessary to substantiate the claim.”260  In contrast, the 
definition of “relevant” in the new standard can be found in 38 U.S.C. § 
101 as “evidence that tends to prove or disprove a matter in issue.”261  
The newer standard of relevant appears to be a lower standard as it only 
needs to prove or disprove the claim at issue, not relate to an 
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unestablished fact that would substantiate the claim.  In any event, the 
VA has acknowledged that this relevant evidence requirement is not 
intended to “impose a higher evidentiary threshold than the previous new 
and material evidence standard . . . .”262 
However, as one commentator noted, the new standard does not 
appear to make supplemental claims easier to adjudicate than reopened 
claims.  “[M]erely trading ‘relevant’ for ‘material’ will not significantly 
reduce the adjudication burden on VA.  Removing ‘relevant’ allows VA 
to adjudicate the merits every time and eliminates the need to make a 
threshold determination.”263  The VA’s new regulations on the 
implementation of the Appeals Modernization Act were issued in 
January of 2018.  The new regulations provide that “relevant” evidence 
can include evidence that raises a theory of entitlement that was not 
previously addressed by the VA.264  As the regulations are not yet in 
effect, it remains to be seen how the VAROs will actually apply these 
standards in the future. 
3. Effective Dates 
In the legacy system, a veteran can only receive benefits back to the 
filing date of their most current claim.  This start date for the award of 
benefits is referred to as the effective date of the claim.  If the veteran 
fails to file an appeal within a year or exhausts all avenues of appeal and 
still finds no relief, the veteran would be forced to file a reopened claim.  
If the reopened claim were granted, the effective date of the veteran’s 
benefits would be as of the date of the reopened claim.  Under the 
Appeals Modernization Act, a major boon for veterans is a change that 
now allows veterans to maintain the original effective date of a claim no 
matter how many times they appeal.265  All that is required is that the 
veteran submit new and relevant evidence within a year of the most 
recent decision made on the claim.266  If a supplemental claim is filed 
after a year has passed, the new effective date will be the date of the 
supplemental claim.267 
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For example, in the current legacy system a veteran who files a 
claim, appeals to the Board, then appeals to the CAVC, and fails to do 
anything else after that has come to the end of the claim.  If six months 
after the CAVC decision the veteran were to find the key medical 
evidence needed to reopen the claim and subsequently wins an award of 
benefits, the effective date begins when the claim is reopened. 
In the new system, when the veteran finds that key piece of evidence 
six months after the CAVC opinion or his Board opinion, the veteran can 
file a supplemental claim and the effective date will be the date of the 
initial claim (which could have been several years earlier).  It is not 
limited to the date the veteran filed the supplemental claim.  However, as 
mentioned before, to benefit from this new rule, the veteran has to file 
the supplemental claim within one year of the Board or CAVC decisions. 
The VA also noted in testimony to Congress that these new rules 
regarding effective dates would allow veterans to better understand what 
evidence was necessary to prove their claims from higher stages of 
appellate review.  The veteran could then come back and file a 
supplemental claim with that necessary evidence, all “without fearing an 
effective-date penalty for choosing to go to the Board first.” 268 
4. Favorable Findings 
Another improvement on the VA adjudication system is that now 
favorable findings made at any level of adjudication are binding upon all 
subsequent adjudications with the VARO and Board, unless clear and 
convincing evidence to rebut the favorable finding is presented.269  This 
protection will have a significant impact on the legacy system where 
every review by the various levels of the VA is de novo. 
B. Major Concerns with the Appeals Modernization Act 
1. Legacy Claims 
The implementation date of the Appeals Modernization Act will be, 
at the earliest, February 2019.270  With some exceptions noted below 
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which are part of a pilot or phased rollout of the Act, claims that are 
waiting in the system and those claims filed before the official 
implementation of the Appeals Modernization Act, will be processed 
under the legacy system.  As of September 2018, there were 403,000 
legacy appeals pending.271 
To begin implementing the new system, Congress authorized the VA 
to start a phased rollout of newly created policies and procedures.272  
This rollout is referred to in the VA as the RAMP program (Rapid 
Appeals Modernization Program).273  To begin, in November 2017 the 
VA mailed invitations to 500 veterans with a currently pending Notices 
of Disagreement or Form 9, or with cases pending certification to the 
Board or remand from the Board.274  The invitations informed the 
veterans of the RAMP program and asked them to participate by 
transferring their currently pending appeals to the higher level review or 
supplemental claim lanes of the new act.275  The letters also advise 
Participation in RAMP is voluntary; however, taking advantage of this 
unique opportunity to use several aspects of the new process may help 
you avoid the delays you are experiencing in the current process.  
Participation in RAMP requires withdrawing your pending 
compensation benefit appeal(s) and substituting the review procedures 
set forth in the Appeals Modernization Act.  VA will process all of 
your eligible appeals under the review lane you select.  For the issues 
addressed under RAMP, you will not be able to request additional 
review of VA’s decision under the current (legacy) appeals process; 
however, you will have access to all the review options and benefits of 
the new process.276 
The VA finalized the regulations necessary to implement the 
Appeals Modernization Act on January 18, 2019, and the Secretary 
certified to Congress that the VA is ready to implement the Act.277  The 
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official implementation date of the Act will be February 19, 2019.278  
After that date, veterans in the legacy system may opt into the new 
system after they receive a Statement of the Case, or they can remain in 
the legacy system and continue through that process.279 
The VA reported to Congress that 10% of eligible veterans would 
need to opt into the program to make RAMP meaningful as an early trial 
of the Appeals Modernization Act procedures.280  As of September 2018, 
the VA reported that 60,000 legacy appeals had been voluntarily 
transferred to the RAMP program.281 
The numbers of veterans voluntarily entering the RAMP program are 
not encouraging.  Neither are the rates of granting a veteran’s claims in 
the Higher Level review path or the Supplemental Claim path, according 
to numbers currently available.  As of September282 2018, the total 
claims approved in the RAMP program was 27% of those considered, 
with 27.2% of those being a Higher Level review and 28.4% being 
Supplemental Claims.  The rate of approval has steadily been decreasing.  
In May of 2018, the total RAMP claims approved were 36% and in 
March 2018 the approved claims were 53%.283  One veterans’ advocate 
posits that this downturn in approval rates may be because the VA 
expanded the claims permitted to move into RAMP from veterans 
targeted specially by the VA to the entirety of the claims in the legacy 
system.284 
The Government Accounting Office (GAO) has expressed other 
concerns with the VA’s plans to deal with the 400,000-plus claims 
currently in the legacy system.  For instance, the VA has no estimated 
time frame for when it will be completely finished with processing 
legacy claims.285  The GAO has also expressed concern that the VA’s 
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plan to implement the Appeals Modernization Act does not appropriately 
designate resources to the two parallel systems running side-by-side for 
an unknown number of years into the future.286  This failure creates “an 
appeals plan that does not specifically articulate how VA will manage 
the two processes in parallel [and] exposes the agency to risk that 
veterans with appeals in the legacy process may experience significant 
delays or otherwise poor results relative to those in the new appeals 
process or vice versa.”287 
2. Duty to Assist 
Despite the concern of stakeholders expressed in meeting to discuss 
the proposed Act, the VA advocated for a limitation in the VA’s duty to 
assist a veteran.  The VA argued that this limitation was necessary 
because in the legacy system “appeals have no defined endpoint and 
require continuous evidence gathering and re-adjudication.”288 
In the legacy system, as has been previously discussed,289 under the 
Veterans Claims Assistance Act and for decades before this codification, 
the VA has had a duty to help a veteran at all steps in the adjudication 
process at the VARO and Board.  Under the Appeals Modernization Act, 
the VA’s duty to assist will apply only to a claim or to a supplemental 
claim.  After the initial decision at the VARO is made on these claims, 
the VA’s duty to assist ends and the veteran is on his own in the process 
of appealing the claim.290  Congress specifically added language to the 
Appeals Modernization Act to ensure that the duty to assist did not apply 
in the Board or higher-level review process.291  While the language of the 
statute provides for a remand to be ordered by the Board back to the 
VARO when violations of the duty to assist at the VARO are discovered 
(for instance, the Board is specifically given authority to remand claims 
regarding the failure to order a medical opinion to the VARO), the 
concerns still exist regarding this change in the law.292 
One of the apprehensions with this limitation on the duty to assist is 
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that due to the limitation on when veterans may hire legal counsel, most 
veterans will not have the benefit of an attorney before choosing the path 
of appeal.  Although the Appeals Modernization Act now permits 
veterans to hire attorneys after receiving the initial decision of the 
VARO, most will likely proceed in decision-making without consulting 
an attorney.293  Failing to explore the options of presenting new evidence 
to an appellate adjudicator can affect a veteran’s chances of succeeding 
on her claims.  In the author’s experience, new evidence, particularly 
new medical opinions concerning etiology of disabling conditions, has 
helped the VA change their minds and grant a veteran benefits 
approximately 84% of the time.294  This potential for a veteran to fail to 
consider an appellate option to submit new medical evidence is 
particularly important in light of the poor medical evaluations provided 
by the VA that purport to, but do not, comply with the duty to assist 
standard.  The VA has previously admitted that “[t]he adequacy of 
medical examinations and opinions, such as those with incomplete 
findings or supporting rationale for an opinion, has remained one of the 
most frequent reasons for remand.”295  One veterans’ advocate has noted 
that “[w]hile VA often cites the veteran’s submission of evidence as 
triggering the need for additional development, the reality is VA has 
consistently demonstrated difficulty fulfilling its fundamental obligation 
to provide veterans with adequate medical examinations and opinions in 
the first instance.”296  Considering this medical examination and opinion 
inadequacy problem, in addition to the other problems the VA has at 
every level that were previously discussed,297 it seems odd that the VA 
would receive Congressional authority to eschew the duty to assist 
veterans with hopes to avoid delay at the expense of aiding veterans. 
This legislative advocacy to eliminate the Board’s duty to assist in 
the Appeals Modernization Act was not the first time that the VA has 
suggested limiting the duty to assist would make adjudicating veterans’ 
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claims go more quickly.  Recently, the VA has begun to systematically 
chip away at the duty to assist veterans in order to speed up the 
processing of claims.  In 2009, the VA began a push towards the filing of 
“Fully Developed Claims” (FDC).298  The FDC process promised faster 
results in processing a veteran’s claim if the veteran would only shoulder 
some of the burden the VA faces by retrieving the veteran’s own 
privately held medical records and all other relevant evidence.299  As of 
February 2019, alleviating itself of the burden of requesting veterans’ 
records has sped the process of adjudicating claims up by four days on 
average, reducing the processing time from 111.4 days on average to 
107.2 days.300 
In 2015, the VA began formalizing the claims process in order to 
make the VA adjudication process easier for the VA.301  The end result of 
this formalization now requires veterans fill out specific VA forms to file 
claims and notices of disagreement.302  This change moved the system 
away from one that complied with the veteran-friendly spirit of the 
system and considered most communications from the veteran as an 
intent to file a claim or appeal.  Now veterans are required to file formal 
claims and disagreements with specifications.303 
Each time the VA chips away at the duty to assist, the VA changes 
course farther away from its guiding principles “to ensure that claimants 
are afforded every opportunity to substantiate their claim, with VA 
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liberally construing the claim, providing assistance, generating evidence, 
developing a claim to its optimum, and granting every benefit that can be 
supported in law.”304  As the process of VA adjudication becomes less 
and less veteran-friendly, the effect that these changes have on veterans’ 
due process rights, for instance the right to hire an attorney at the 
beginning of the VA process, will require further scrutiny in the future.305 
3. Rating Decision Explanations 
Based upon the working group’s recommendations, Congress 
determined “that [VA rating] decision notification letters must be clear, 
easy to understand and easy to navigate.  The notice letter must convey 
not only VA’s rationale for reaching its determination, but also the 
options available to claimants after receipt of the decision.”306  To 
accomplish this goal, the Appeals Modernization Act mandates that each 
decision letter provide the veteran (1) an identification of the issues 
adjudicated, (2) a summary of the evidence considered, (3) a summary of 
applicable laws and regulations, (4) identification of findings favorable 
to the veteran, (5) identification of elements not satisfied that led to a 
denial, (6) an explanation of how to obtain or access evidence used in 
decision-making, and (7) identification of criteria that must be satisfied 
to grant service connection at the next higher level of compensation.307  
While in theory this list sounds like a major benefit of the new system, 
these things are already required in the legacy system when the VA 
issues a Statement of the Case.308  Unfortunately, these notifications are 
notoriously poor, with the VA satisfying its duty to explain its decision-
making by copying and pasting dozens of pages worth of single spaced 
portions of the Code of Federal Regulations and sending them to the 
veteran.309  One hopes that this new legislation will remedy the problems 
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that evolved with the Statement of the Case, but it is worth keeping an 
eye on to see how this portion of the legislation evolves in action. 
4. Same Problems, Different Legislation 
Other concerns about the Appeals Modernization Act revolve around 
one basic consideration: without fixing underlying problems within the 
VA adjudication system the method in which veterans appeal these 
decisions will not make any appreciable difference.  Certainly, these 
changes may cut the backlog and delay in obtaining decisions, but if 
these decisions are not adequate or accurate, veterans will also lose in the 
end. 
The Disabled American Veterans spokesperson properly commented 
during congressional hearings on the new appeals legislation that “the 
most important principle for reforming the claims process was getting the 
decision right the first time . . . .”310  The decision-making must be 
reformed first and has been laboring in inadequacy for quite a while.  In 
the 1980s the VA indicated that remands of VARO decisions: 
may be an indication of several system wide problems—for example, 
poor original claims development within the DVA regional offices, 
inadequate medical examinations conducted by private or VA 
physicians, overworked adjudications within both DVB [Department of 
Veterans Benefits of the Veterans Administration] and BVA, [and] 
uncertainties regarding the resolution of highly complex cases like 
post-traumatic stress disorder or radiation exposure.311 
Unfortunately, poor development and inadequate medical 
examinations are cited as the most common problems in adjudication 
over thirty years later.312  The Appeals Modernization Act focuses on 
process but “is devoid of reform to the foundational underpinning of the 
claims adjudication and appeals process, i.e., the need for an adequate 
medical examination and opinion.”313 
Additionally, much of the success of the Appeals Modernization Act 
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depends upon the VA’s own proposed implementation schedule.  As the 
National Organization for Veterans Advocates executive director noted: 
Successful execution of VA’s proposed process hinges on its ability to 
consistently meet its goals of adjudicating and issuing decisions in the 
125-day window identified in its “middle lane” and deciding appeals 
within the one-year period before BVA.  As demonstrated with the 
prior backlog of original claims and scheduling of medical 
appointments, VA often struggles to meet its own internal goals to the 
detriment of veterans.314 
The GAO has also expressed concern that the VA discusses 
measuring progress by the time it takes to process claims, but has no 
particular plan to measure “accuracy of decision, veteran satisfaction 
with the process, or cost.”315  By overlooking these basic concerns, “VA 
could be inadvertently creating skewed incentives by focusing on one 
area of program performance to the detriment of other areas (e.g., 
processing claims quickly but inaccurately).”316 
Unfortunately, one commentator summed up the relationship 
between the VA and veterans when Congress mandates the VA change 
this way: 
From the veteran’s perspective, it can be put this way: now that the VA 
is forced to play by the rules, it wants to change them.  Consequently, it 
appears that the veteran’s battle for effective judicial review of VA 
decisions is not over; it has just moved to a new phase: consolidation 
and preparation for a VA counterattack in both the legislative and 
regulatory theaters.317 
Veterans, Congress, and advocates will want to pay particular 
attention to how the VA measures success in the implementation of this 
new process to ensure that veterans are actually giving up current 
benefits, such as the duty to assist throughout the process, for true gains. 
IV. A QUESTION OF CHARACTER 
America has been conducting two major wartime operations since 
2001.  Since that time, the military has been faced with the monumental 
task of taking a servicemember trained for military service and, once that 
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service is completed, reintegrating them back into civilian society.318  
These 2.7 million returning current-conflict veterans exist alongside of 
the 3.4 million Vietnam veterans, many of whom bear not just physical 
scars from combat, but psychological scars that have remained 
undiagnosed and untreated for decades.319  For many military veterans, 
the reintegration into civilian society is seamless.  For others, particularly 
those suffering from PTSD, traumatic brain injuries (TBIs), and other 
“invisible wounds of war,” the integration can be more complicated.320  
Some estimates indicate that almost 24% of post-9/11 veterans suffer 
from a mental health condition.321  “Both PTSD and mTBI (mild TBI) 
may result in a series of cognitive, behavioral, and mood changes 
impacting an individual’s ability to function in society.  Some of those 
changes include poor attention, memory difficulties, depressed mood and 
rapid fluctuations in mood, poor impulse control, and disregard for social 
norms.”322  For veterans suffering from any of these conditions, there is a 
higher likelihood of using alcohol, illicit substances, or prescription 
drugs to ameliorate the symptoms of these illnesses, particularly if they 
are undiagnosed or untreated.323 
Oftentimes, the behavior associated with PTSD and TBI is behavior 
that puts servicemembers directly at odds with their commanders and the 
larger military culture.  Certain symptoms associated with PTSD and 
TBI, such as poor impulse control, loss of temper, impaired thinking, and 
poor exercise of judgment, may appear indistinguishable from the 
behavior of a servicemember who has chosen to rebel against the good 
order and discipline so necessary to the military’s culture.  Those who 
exhibit such symptoms, particularly if the conditions are undiagnosed or 
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untreated, are at risk of being involuntarily separated from the military, 
or being court-martialed (i.e. criminally prosecuted) for their behavior. 
When servicemembers leave active military service, their branch of 
service assigns a characterization of the discharge to describe their 
service in the military.  Servicemembers leave the military for any 
number of reasons to include the natural expiration of their contract to 
serve, involuntarily separation from service, or discharge by sentence of 
a court-martial.  There are primarily five different characterization of 
service, or discharges: Honorable, General (Under Honorable 
Conditions), Other Than Honorable, Bad Conduct, and Dishonorable.324  
The first three—Honorable, General, and Other Than Honorable—are 
assigned during the military’s administrative assessment of whether the 
servicemember should be separated from the service.325  An Honorable 
discharge indicates that the servicemember “has met the standards of 
acceptable conduct and performance of duty for military personnel.”326  
These discharges are normally assigned to those servicemembers who 
have had no significant disciplinary problems during service and are 
either at the natural expiration of their service commitment or have a 
need for an administrative separation not due to misconduct, such as a 
voluntary discharge due to pregnancy.327  General discharges are 
assigned to servicemembers who have a disciplinary history, “when the 
positive aspects of the [s]ervice member’s conduct or performance of 
duty outweigh negative aspects . . . .”328  A discharge under Other than 
Honorable conditions is assigned “when the reason for separation is 
based upon a pattern of behavior” or upon “one or more acts or 
omissions that constitute a significant departure from the conduct 
expected . . . .”329 
Servicemembers court-martialed under the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice who receive a punitive discharge as a part of their sentence can 
receive either a Bad Conduct discharge or a Dishonorable discharge.330  
“[The Bad Conduct] discharge is less severe than a [D]ishonorable 
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discharge . . . [i]t is also appropriate for an accused who has been 
convicted repeatedly of minor offenses and whose punitive separation 
appears to be necessary.”331  The Dishonorable discharge “should be 
reserved for those who should be separated under conditions of dishonor, 
after having been convicted of offenses usually recognized in civilian 
jurisdictions as felonies, or of offenses of a military nature requiring 
severe punishment.”332 
As a practical matter, the standard discharge is an Honorable, and a 
servicemember is perceived to have been a substandard performer or 
disciplinary problem to have received any discharge but Honorable.  For 
veterans who receive discharges that are not Honorable or General, the 
consequences can be severe.  These discharges can affect their rights to 
benefits administered by the VA, such as educational grants, home loans, 
healthcare, and disability benefits.333  Veterans with poor discharges also 
find problems later with securing employment.334 
Since the Vietnam War, America’s military has had a problem 
determining the character of service for veterans who suffer service-
caused injuries that are not physically apparent.  For many Vietnam 
veterans, the primary invisible condition affecting behavior is PTSD.335  
Iraq and Afghanistan veterans find themselves suffering from higher 
numbers of brain injury in addition to PTSD, a result of the life-saving 
technologies and body armor, which help to limit the impact of 
explosions that in previous conflicts would have caused death.336  While 
this problem does not affect all of our current-conflict veterans, it is 
broader than our society would like, and its actual effect on those who 
have been on the receiving end of these discharge determinations can be 
devastating.  The inability of the military to appropriately diagnose and 
treat servicemembers, thereby denying them appropriate medical 
discharges or VA benefits when the leave active service is equally 
damaging. 
                                                            
 331.   Rules for Courts-Martial 1003(b)(8)(C) (2016). 
 332.   Id. at (b)(8)(B). 
 333.   38 U.S.C. § 101(2) (2012 & Supp. 2017); 38 C.F.R. § 3.12 (2017). 
 334.   Marcy L. Karin, “Other Than Honorable” Discrimination, 67 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 135, 
165 (2016); Claire Voegele, Never Again: Correcting the Administrative Abandonment of Vietnam 
Veterans with Other Than Honorable Discharges Induced by Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 68 
S.C. L. REV. 245, 252 (2016). 
 335.   See generally RICHARD A. KULKA ET AL., NATIONAL VIETNAM VETERANS 
READJUSTMENT STUDY: CONTRACTUAL REPORT OF FINDINGS VOLUME I (1988), 
https://www.ptsd.va.gov/professional/articles/article-pdf/nvvrs_vol1.pdf [https://perma.cc/RYL6-
NH69] (reporting that PTSD affected Vietnam veterans in higher numbers than other disabling 
conditions). 
 336.   Simcox et al., supra note 322, at 382. 
2019 THIRTY YEARS OF VETERANS LAW 565 
The failure of the United States military to understand the effect that 
combat had on Vietnam veterans at the time of their service and 
misconduct is logically understandable because PTSD was not even a 
recognized mental health condition until years after many Vietnam 
veterans left service.337  However, the failure of the military to recognize 
and treat servicemembers from our current conflicts is inexcusable.  
There have been several investigative reports and journalistic efforts on 
whether this failure is nefarious or merely due to incompetence.  Either 
way, the damage to these injured veterans is tremendous.  As just one 
example, Fort Carson, Colorado, is home to a large and storied Army 
division, the 4th Infantry Division.  While the bulk of the division was 
located at Fort Hood, Texas until 2009, some portions of the division 
began to relocate to Fort Carson as early as 2006.338  In addition, Fort 
Carson was already home to other combat units including the 4th 
Engineer Battalion (Combat Effects), the 13th Air Support Operations 
Squadron, an Air Force component—which provides close air support, 
the 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team—which deployed to Iraq combat 
three times from 2003-2008, and the 10th Special Forces Group, 
consisting of over 2000 special forces soldiers.339  In the early stages of 
the wars in the Middle East, Fort Carson had numerous combat troops 
and was deploying thousands of servicemembers to Iraq and 
Afghanistan. 
However, as early as 2006, reports began circulating that something 
was amiss in the Army’s treatment of soldiers returning to Fort Carson 
who exhibited symptoms of PTSD.  Some of these suffering soldiers 
were treated as untouchables by friends and military supervisors.340  One 
sergeant/supervisor explained that there is contempt for soldiers who 
develop PTSD because others saw the same “horrors of the war” and are 
“not falling apart.”341  “People are trying to say they have problems who 
don’t.  Just because people are, you know, getting in trouble and they’re 
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blaming it on PTSD.”342  These soldiers were described as “weak,” “dirt 
bags,” and told that “[t]hey [don’t] belong in the Army.”343  Others were 
shuffled off to other units or punished for PTSD-related behavior 
because the command had no time to deal with soldiers needing special 
attention while the units were getting ready to immediately deploy to 
Iraq.  As one sergeant put it “When I’m dealing with [one soldier’s] 
personal problems on a daily basis, I don’t have time to train soldiers to 
fight in Iraq.  I have to get rid of him, because he is a detriment to the 
rest of the soldiers.”344 
Another soldier reported (and his supervisor confirmed) that his 
chain of command at Fort Carson required him to participate in training 
exercises that forced him to miss PTSD and family therapy 
appointments.345  One soldier in 10th Special Forces Group was court-
martialed for cowardice after suffering an involuntary panic attack in 
Iraq upon seeing a mangled body.346  It was the first time in thirty-five 
years that anyone had been charged with the crime of cowardice, which 
comes with a penalty of death.  He was acquitted of the charges four 
years later.347  Reports such as this prompted several U.S. Senators to 
write the Department of Defense in 2006, urging it to launch an 
investigation into how commanders at Fort Carson treated those 
suffering from PTSD.348 
In 2008, more troubling events occurred at Fort Carson, which 
indicate that it was not just a problem of bad discharges affecting 
soldiers, but also a problem of inaccurate mental health diagnoses that 
could affect potential future benefits from the VA and military.  In June 
of that year, a soldier who was suffering from TBI and PTSD 
surreptitiously recorded a conversation between himself and the Fort 
Carson psychologist assigned to evaluate him for medical retirement.349  
The soldier recorded the conversation because he was experiencing 
                                                            
 342.   Id.  
 343.   Zwerdling, supra note 341. 
 344.   Zwerdling, supra note 340. 
 345.   Zwerdling, supra note 341. 
 346.   Joel Warner, The Good Soldier, WESTWORD (Mar. 20, 2008) https://www.westword.com/ 
news/the-good-soldier-5098099 [https://perma.cc/9JTP-7KX6].   
 347.   Id.   
 348.   Letter from Senators Barbara Boxer, Christopher Bond, and Barack Obama to William 
Winkenwerder, Jr. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (Dec. 7, 2006), 
https://www.npr.org/documents/2006/dec/letter_to_winkenwerder.pdf [https://perma.cc/3XHK-
SCNM].  
 349.   Mark Benjamin & Michael De Yoanna, I am Under a Lot of Pressure to Not Diagnose 
PTSD, SALON (Apr. 8, 2009), https://www.salon.com/2009/04/08/tape/ [https://perma.cc/3S4P-
84FX].  
2019 THIRTY YEARS OF VETERANS LAW 567 
memory problems and could not remember what the doctors were saying 
to him—he needed to have the recording to let his wife know the details 
of the doctor’s treatment.350  The psychologist, Dr. McNinch, was 
recorded telling the soldier: 
“I will tell you something confidentially that I would have to deny if it 
were ever public.  Not only myself, but all the clinicians up here are 
being pressured to not diagnose PTSD and diagnose anxiety disorder 
NOS (not otherwise specified) [instead].”  McNinch told him that 
Army medical boards were “kick[ing] back” his diagnoses of PTSD, 
saying soldiers had not seen enough trauma to have “serious PTSD 
issues.”351 
These types of misdiagnoses could result in improper treatment and 
lower disability payments if the Army discharges a soldier from the 
military.352  The Army investigated itself after this incidence and found 
there was no wrongdoing.353 
The Fort Carson problems are one example of what injured soldiers 
in the military, particularly in the early to mid-2000s, were up against 
when it came to military discharges.  These issues were not just limited 
to Fort Carson.  For instance, a government report issued in 2008 
revealed that the Department of Defense had erroneously discharged 
hundreds of veterans between 2001 and 2010 for “personality disorder,” 
a condition not entitled to receive benefits from the VA, when in fact the 
veterans had been suffering from PTSD or TBI.354  A few years later, the 
Army settled a class action suit brought on behalf of 1,029 veterans who 
were wrongfully denied disability benefits due to the Army’s failure to 
adequately assess the severity of their conditions.355  The numbers of 
servicemembers suffering from mental health conditions and brain 
injuries who are separated from service for misconduct is equally 
concerning.  Between 2011 and 2015, 11% of servicemembers separated 
for misconduct suffered TBI, and 47% suffered from a mental health 
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condition that shares symptoms with PTSD such as depression and 
anxiety (8% of these were diagnosed with PTSD).356  A Government 
Accountability Office report also found that the branches of the military 
often were not following their own regulations requiring them to 
consider PTSD and TBI as mitigating factors before making decisions on 
the character of a veteran’s discharge.357 
For veterans wishing to request that the military upgrade their 
discharges or change the reason for discharge after the fact (for example, 
changing a discharge from personality disorder to a retirement for PTSD) 
they must apply directly to their former service branch.  Each branch 
(Army, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard) has two boards that can 
review discharges.358  The first level is referred to as the Discharge 
Review Board.359  These boards can change a discharge under the 
theories of propriety and equity.360  The second level of review, to which 
the veteran can appeal from the Discharge Review Board, is called the 
Board for Correction of Military Records.  This Board has much broader 
authority to correct any “issue involving a veteran’s military service that 
constitute an injustice, including changing and upgrading discharges . . . 
if there is material error or injustice.”361  Decisions by the boards can be 
appealed to federal court.362 
While it seems there is a procedure in place to adequately and fairly 
fix problems that may occur when a servicemember is discharged from 
active duty with a bad or inappropriate discharge, the evidence says 
otherwise.  In 2014, an investigative journalist published an article after 
she had reviewed over 3,000 applications made to the Army’s Board for 
Correction of Military Records and interviewed veterans and Board 
members alike.363  Her article shockingly uncovered that the Board has 
only three minutes and forty-five seconds on average to review a 
veteran’s application for upgrade, despite the fact that some submit 
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evidence that makes the application several hundred pages long.  
Between 2009 and 2012, the Board reviewed over 36,000 applications 
for upgrade, but granted only one veteran’s request for a personal 
appearance with the Board.364  The reporter, Alissa Figueroa, said that 
she was stunned after reading the Board’s opinions: “[t]hey were filled 
with derogatory language, denigrating the injured soldiers who were 
appealing their cases.  And so many of the decisions were based on 
factual errors, crazy mistakes that led to these bizarre conclusions.  Other 
decisions had such mangled logic, they blew my mind.” 365  Tom Moore, 
an advocate with the National Veterans Legal Service Program, 
remarked that “[t]his is the last chance for these servicemembers to have 
their records corrected, and when we look through these cases we see 
these incredible errors that are so blatant.”366  One former Army Board 
employee chalked the problems up to the fact that “in an effort to decide 
cases quickly they reject admissible evidence, do not hold hearings, and 
issue summary denials to applicants that often do not address evidence 
brought.”367  Low rates of approval for discharge upgrades have been 
fairly consistent, even before the influx of current conflict veteran 
applications.  Over the last fifteen years, petitions for upgrade based 
upon PTSD submitted by Vietnam veterans were denied 95% of the 
time.368 
To force the Department of Defense to deal with inadequate 
processes for seeking upgrades, five Vietnam combat veterans filed suit 
against the Department of Defense in 2014 “seeking relief for tens of 
thousands of similarly situated veterans who developed PTSD and were 
subsequently discharged with Other Than Honorable characterization.”369 
Based upon stories like these as well as the tireless advocacy of 
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various Veterans Service Organizations and other stakeholders, the 
Boards are being forced to consider potential mitigating factors for a 
veteran’s misconduct.  In 2014, in an effort to recognize that Vietnam 
veterans with bad discharges may have committed their misconduct 
because of undiagnosed PTSD and almost certainly in response to the 
Monk v. Mabus filings, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel issued 
guidance to the Department of Defense on how to handle requests by 
these veterans for a discharge upgrade.370  Issuing what is now referred to 
as “the Hagel Memo,” he ordered that for every application of upgrade 
made by a veteran who claims to have suffered from PTSD, the Boards 
must give “liberal consideration” to cases where service records 
document any symptom of PTSD, despite having no diagnosis available, 
or where a veteran received a subsequent PTSD diagnosis that is deemed 
to be service-connected.  The Boards are then ordered to view these 
conditions as mitigating factors for the misconduct that occurred during 
active service.371  Supplemental guidance expanded these directives to 
apply to the Discharge Review Boards as well and to veterans from every 
era of service, not just those who served in Vietnam.372 
As the Department of Defense began to clean its own house, 
Congress also got involved.  In 2016, Congress passed with bipartisan 
approval the Fairness for Veterans Act of 2016, which would have 
required the boards to review veterans’ applications for upgrade with “a 
rebuttable presumption in favor of the former member that post-
traumatic stress disorder or traumatic brain injury materially contributed 
to the circumstances resulting in the discharge of a lesser 
characterization.” 373  While this bill died in Congress,374 the National 
Defense Authorization Act of 2017 did include a memorialization of the 
Hagel Memo along with other guidelines to help the boards improve 
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their processes in reviewing applications for upgrade.375 
The need for advocacy and expansion of this area of veterans law 
still exists despite legislation and the Department of Defense’s 
acknowledgement of its problems in the discharge upgrade process.  The 
initial numbers for the Board’s review of discharge upgrade cases under 
the Hagel Memo looked promising.  The first year saw 45% of requests 
for discharge upgrades due to PTSD granted, compared to 3.7% the prior 
year.376  More interestingly, due to massive pushes by veterans’ 
advocates in the media and within their own clientele, and on the order of 
Secretary Hagel that the branches should reach out to potentially affected 
veterans, applications for upgrade based upon PTSD rose five times in 
that same year.377  However, two current-conflict veterans filed suit 
against the Army in 2016, seeking class-action status because the Army 
was not implementing the Hagel guidance at the Discharge Review 
Board level.378  One plaintiff, when discussing that before he filed his 
lawsuit his application was denied and yet after he filed suit the same 
application was approved by the Army’s Discharge Review Board, 
remarked: 
We didn’t add anything to what I filed originally and got a completely 
different result because a judge was watching, . . .[t]o take the exact 
same case and come to a completely different outcome shows the need 
for everyone to get a review like this.  When no one is watching, they 
are not doing this properly, . . . . It shouldn’t take a small army of 
lawyers, a class action lawsuit, and eight years to get the Army to 
follow their own rules, . . . most veterans with PTSD are in no position 
to fight the Army like this, and veterans are dying while the Army 
drags its feet on properly handling these cases.379 
The efforts of veterans advocacy organizations to train attorneys 
helping veterans navigate the discharge upgrade process, with the efforts 
of organizations such as the National Veterans Legal Services Program, 
the Vietnam Veterans of America, law school veterans clinics across the 
country—in particular Yale Law School’s Jerome N. Frank Legal 
Services Organization—that litigate the Department of Defense’s failure 
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to correctly implement its own guidelines, are paving the way for 
increased efforts on behalf of veterans in this previously-stagnating area 
of veterans law.  The development of discharge upgrades and the 
Department of Defense’s retooling of regulation to prevent unjust 
discharge from occurring in the first place will be worth tracking in the 
next few years as these efforts come to fruition and spark new efforts. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For decades, veterans’ advocates have lobbied Congress to do more 
for our veterans, by filling in the gaps that the VA is unable to fill on its 
own.  Slowly but surely, Congress has listened.  From the creation of the 
CAVC to the Appeals Modernization Act, the law applying to veterans 
benefits has been forever altered, in ways that are always challenging, 
but on the whole beneficial for veterans. 
The expansion of the CAVC’s authority to affect the issue of delay 
in the VA’s adjudication system by allowing class-action lawsuits to be 
filed could be the most significant change in veterans law in the past 
thirty years.  The qualification “could be” is a telling one.  The CAVC 
must seize their newfound capability to aggregate veterans’ claims in 
order to effectuate major change in a system that continues to have the 
same problems decade after decade while the agency accusingly points 
the finger of blame at various foes.  The complicated nature of the claims 
being processed, the increasing numbers of veterans, the recent 
appearance of judicial review, the changes in the regulations by the 
Secretary, the VCAA, and the duty to assist have all, at one time or 
another, been the villain in VA’s constant tap-dance before Congress to 
explain why more money, employees, and years to implement judicial 
decisions have not made an impact on the VA’s ability to keep up.  The 
VA has skirted these issues in court, primarily by mooting lawsuits with 
quick decisions granting all of the veterans’ benefits.  As taxpayers, one 
must question the VA’s motives and competency when those decisions 
are made so much more quickly than other claims and in a manner that 
seems calculated to protect the VA’s bureaucratic interests.  The CAVC 
may finally be able to make decisions that will force the VA to change 
the way it does business internally.  For example, the CVAC could 
ensure better medical evaluations are sought in the first instances of a 
claim. 
The Appeals Modernization Act’s alteration of the appeals process 
leading to the CAVC brings welcome change to the process, yet it raises 
some significant concerns.  It does not change the underlying systemic 
problems in the VARO or Board, but does limit the benefits of a veteran-
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friendly process in a monumental sweeping change of course.  The 
changes appear to value speed of adjudication over accuracy, and the 
ability of the changes to affect how quickly decisions will be made is 
questionable—particularly in light of the GAO’s concerns regarding 
implementation of the Act and measurements of success.  The new 
legislation demonstrates that there is an incredible amount of work to do 
and law to make in the very near future that will affect the millions of 
veterans and their families in the United States.  It is an ever-changing 
backdrop of legal authority that can be shaped into a tool for veterans or 
a weapon against their interests, depending on the quality of the 
advocates and implementers both inside and outside the VA who step 
into the breach. 
The spotlight recently shined upon the labors of veterans struggling 
with unjust discharges has already made a difference for large numbers 
of veterans previously denied relief.  The job is not over.  The military 
continues to struggle with cultural taboos regarding identification and 
treatment of PTSD and TBI that must be overcome for our future 
servicemembers.  The rectification of this situation for our current 
veterans is of paramount importance if we are to continue to reintegrate 
them into society as a whole. 
As veterans advocates know, the content of Congress’ answers to 
veterans’ queries is not the final answer.  It is in the execution of the 
resulting programs and laws where one finds the true work that must be 
done.  Each day, veterans and their advocates have the opportunity to 
change the conversation and alter the legal landscape affecting veterans 
benefits, discharges, and legal involvement.  Veterans law offers 
unexplored possibilities, beyond the legal boundaries that exists today, 
much like the Wild West.  As these examples demonstrate, change is 
possible with creativity, work, and an understanding of the most 
important aspect of this area of law—serving those who have served our 
nation.  Practicing veterans law in the next decade will offer unlimited 
opportunities for those brave-of-heart who choose to demonstrate the 
spirit of a true pioneer and look for different ways to shape the landscape 
for the benefit of our nation’s veterans.  As John Wayne said, 
“[s]ometimes it isn’t being fast that counts, or even accurate; but 
willing.”380  Welcome to the Wild West! 
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